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At the time of writing this thesis, there are ongoing armed conflicts in 8 African countries 
where thousands of children are being killed, maimed, displaced, and abducted into armed 
groups and in some cases into armed forces to serve as child soldiers, sex slaves, and 
porters among other roles that violate their rights. Thousands of other children face 
vulnerabilities in post-conflict situations including lack of basic services and separation from 
their families. Grave violations of children‟s rights in armed conflicts are taking place despite 
many African countries being signatories to international and regional instruments that 
provide for children‟s protection in such situations most notably the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. At the time of 
writing, the latter has been adopted by 47 out of 54 member states of the African Union (AU) 
– a regional organization that is a major actor in the area of peace and security in Africa and 
one that has established institutional and legal mechanisms to protect human rights. The aim 
of this study is to investigate whether the AU has the capacity to protect children in armed 
conflicts. Given the gravity of the situation in Africa and the fact that children make up about 
half of the continent‟s population it seems that addressing this issue is a test of the AU‟s 
commitment to ensuring peace and security and protecting human rights. This study attempts 
to contribute to the dearth of literature on this subject. 
 
Using grounded theory methodology, a theory was developed to address the question of 
whether the AU has the capacity to protect children in armed conflicts. This was based on 
coding and analysis of in-depth interviews with key informants – who are knowledgeable on 
the subject - as well as a review of literature particularly on the role played by the African 
Union (AU) in addressing the problem. The theory developed by this study is that the AU‟s 
lack of capacity to protect children in armed conflict is both a manifestation and a product of 
the issue not being high on its agenda. 
 
This study found that the AU lacks the institutional and structural capacity to protect children 
in armed conflicts and a determining factor is a lack of political will among many of its member 
states to deal with the issue. Institutional and structural challenges in the AU that militate 
against protection of children in armed conflicts being high on its agenda lie in the areas of: 
setting priorities, structure, resources and capacity, and coordination with other actors. 
 
Keywords: children in armed conflicts, African Union, child rights, child protection, peace and 
security 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
"Safety and security don’t just happen: they are the result of collective consensus and public 
investment. (…) We owe our children – the most vulnerable citizens in any society – a life free 
from violence and fear."  
 
(Nelson Mandela, Former President of the Republic of South Africa, cited in Krug E.G et al. 
(eds.) 2002, p. ix).  
 
Background 
 
Protection of children in armed conflicts (CIAC) has been on the international political agenda 
for more than 2 decades. International and regional norms and institutions have been 
established to address the issue however during armed conflicts children‟s wellbeing and 
psychosocial development remains under threat as they are killed, maimed or fall victim to 
many kinds of abuses and vulnerabilities. A 2009 report by the United Nations Children‟s 
Fund (UNICEF) entitled Machel Study 10-year Strategic Review: Children and Conflict in a 
Changing World stated that: “according to 2006 estimates, more than 1 billion children under 
the age of 18 were living in areas in conflict or emerging from war. Of these, an estimated 300 
million were under age five, and more than 18 million children were refugees or internally 
displaced” (2009, p.iv). A common and widely reported abuse is the forcible recruitment of 
children into national armed forces or armed groups to take a direct part in hostilities-widely 
referred to as child soldiers. Children may sometimes join voluntarily to support their families 
financially or to avenge the killing of a family member by the other party to the conflict. Jean 
Francois Basse1 says that: “it is now common cause that children are more likely to become 
child soldiers if they are separated from their families, displaced from their homes, living in 
combat zones or have limited access to education”. Children captured during armed conflicts 
are held in detention for associating with armed groups. Boys and girls are abducted or 
forcibly recruited to serve as porters and sex slaves. However, girls are particularly vulnerable 
                                                          
1
 Jean François Basse (Child Protection Adviser, Department of Peace and Security, African Union 
Commission), Interviewed on 1 September 2014 by email. 
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to rape and sexual violence by armed groups and in some cases armed forces as well. They 
are more often than not abducted to be sex slaves or child brides and many give birth during 
armed conflicts and in cases of protracted conflicts their children may eventually take part in 
hostilities.  
 
Children who are fortunate to escape from areas of armed conflict end up as child refugees in 
neighboring countries or internally displaced persons (IDPs) within their own country. Many 
children become orphans as their parents are killed during armed conflicts while others are 
separated from their families and have to live under the care of community members until 
their parents are found and this comes with possible risks of abuse and exploitation. This 
breakdown of family and community support systems, particularly in poor countries, puts 
children at a particular disadvantage than other vulnerable groups during armed conflict as 
they are highly dependent on these structures in the absence or incapacity of government 
services. Dr Shimelis Tsegaye2 observes that: “[CIAC] have very limited protection from 
formal government structures, and the family, as both these institutions often break up or 
might be caught up in the conflict and fail to operate adequately, or fail to enforce the existing 
laws and policies. These children may experience post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in 
post-conflict situations. Children may also face abuse and vulnerabilities in refugee or IDP 
camps which are supposed to be safe havens. As a result of psychological trauma that they 
experience, reintegration into their communities is difficult especially for child soldiers.  
Therefore the impact of armed conflicts on children‟s wellbeing and psychosocial 
development lasts well beyond the duration of hostilities and can leave an indelible mark on 
them. Although violations of children‟s rights in armed conflicts are an international problem, 
children in Africa have been particularly affected as the continent has experienced a greater 
number of armed conflicts than in other parts of the world. 
 
Despite the ratification of majority of African countries to international and regional 
instruments that address the needs of CIAC such as the United Nations (UN) Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
                                                          
2
 Shimelis Tsegaye (Head of the Child and the Family Programme, The African Child Policy Forum (ACPF)] 
Interviewed on 15 August 2013 via email. 
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(ACRWC), children on the continent continue to face many kinds of abuses and vulnerabilities 
in armed conflicts. To put the issue into context one has to consider that children currently 
make up about half of Africa‟s population and global projections estimate that the continent‟s 
child population will increase exponentially. A 2014 report by UNICEF entitled Generation 
2030/Africa: Child Demographics in Africa states that: “almost 2 billion babies will be born in 
Africa in the next 35 years. Over the same period Africa‟s under-18 population will increase by 
two thirds, reaching almost 1 billion by mid-century; and close to half of the world population 
of children will be African by the end of the 21st century” (2014, p.5).  At present, children are 
being affected by armed conflicts in Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Somalia, Libya, South Sudan, Mali, Sudan (Darfur), and Nigeria. A report 
entitled The State of Africa’s Children Report 2010 by the African Union‟s (AU) Department of 
Social Affairs states that: “[t]here are an estimated 120,000 children associated with armed 
forces and armed groups in Africa” (African Union 2010b, p.86). However, a report by the 
African Child Policy Forum (ACPF)3 entitled The African Report on Child Wellbeing 2013: 
Towards greater accountability to Africa’s children says that: “Africa has fewer conflict-related 
deaths among children than a decade ago” (ACPF 2013, p.xiii). Table 1 below presents data 
obtained from the annual report of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to the UN Security 
Council on the situation of CIAC from January to December 2013 (Secretary General Report 
2014). It shows that grave violations against CIAC are particularly acute in Somalia which is 
higher than it is in DRC-a country that is about 3.6 times larger in size. All countries listed in 
Table 1 below are on the agenda of the UN Security Council and in most cases both 
government armed forces and armed groups are implicated as being engaged in child 
recruitment. A report released by the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC 
(MONUSCO) on 24 October 2013 entitled Child Recruitment by Armed Groups in DRC From 
January 2012 to August 2013 states that recruitment of children by armed forces in the DRC 
is systemic (MONUSCO 2013). 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Pan-African center for policy research and dialogue on the African child based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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Table 1: Data on grave violations against children in armed conflicts in select AU 
member states from January-December 2013 
 
Country Children 
Killed 
Children 
Maimed 
or 
Injured 
Children Recruited 
by Armed Forces or 
Groups 
Cases of Sexual 
Violence Against 
Children 
Central African 
Republic4 
 
27 115 188 (171 boys and 17 
girls) 
20 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
 
68 96 910 (783 boys and 
127 girls)  
209 
Somalia 
 
237 494 1,293 154 
South Sudan 
 
63 83 162 7 
Sudan (Darfur) 
 
91 98 18 62 
Sudan (South 
Kordofan, Blue Nile 
State, Abyei)  
 
6 31 42  3* 
Mali 
 
6 51 57  
* The UN Secretary General says that this low figure is due to “limited monitoring capacity” in the 
areas. 
Source: Secretary General Report (2014) 
 
Children face vulnerabilities in post-conflict situations (e.g. Ivory Coast) including lack of basic 
services and separation from their families. Franco Wandabwa5 says that children previously 
associated with armed groups in Liberia are having a hard time reintegrating in their 
communities. This country experienced a military coup and two civil wars from 1980-2003. UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon reported that during 2013 57 children were recruited by 
armed groups in Mali and “explosive remnants” killed 6 and injured 51 (Secretary General 
Report 2014). From January 2012 to early 2013, the country experienced a military coup as 
well as an armed conflict with a secessionist armed group. With regards to Ivory Coast, the 
                                                          
4
 As UN monitoring was restricted in this country the reported cases of grave violations against children are only 
indicative. 
5
 Franco Wandabwa (Advocacy Director, Africa Area Office, Save the Children) Interviewed on July 25, 2013 in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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UN Secretary General said that the UN was able to confirm 30 grave violations against 
children, especially sexual violence against girls with 23 documented cases (Ibid). The Lord‟s 
Resistance Army (LRA)-a rebel group led by Joseph Kony that is accused of committing 
grave violations against thousands of children in Uganda (including abducting them as child 
soldiers, sex slaves and porters) is currently spread out along border areas between the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, and South Sudan where it has 
caused the displacement of 353,000 persons many of whom are children (Secretary General 
Report 2014). Franco Wandabwa6 says that: “some of those children [who were abducted in 
Uganda] have grown into adults and some of them are giving birth to children who are also 
becoming child soldiers”.  
 
The UN Secretary General‟s Report (2014) points out that most of its data and statistics on 
the number of CIAC and post-conflict situations in Africa are indicative and in most cases 
underreported due to the UN‟s limited monitoring capacity in some countries and government 
restrictions on access in others. Vincent Ochilet7 says that restrictions on access to children 
and women affected by armed conflicts are sometimes used as a weapon of war. Hence due 
to restrictions on access and limited capacity to monitor violations against CIAC many 
children may remain invisible with perpetrators continuing to act with impunity.  
 
Children in post-conflict situations are vulnerable to a resurgence of hostilities. In a 2013 
report by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC)8 entitled Report of the Peace and 
Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa to the Twenty 
First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union it warned that: “the progress made to 
resolve conflict [in Africa] remains particularly fragile, with a high risk of reversal, whether in 
Mali, the Great Lakes Region, Somalia, Darfur or in the relations between Sudan and South 
Sudan” (African Union 2013d, p.2). Relations between Sudan and South Sudan are 
particularly fragile as each is vying for greater control over rich oil resources in the border 
area of Abyei.  
                                                          
6
 Interview, 25 July 2013. 
7
 Vincent Ochilet (Deputy Head , International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to the African Union) 
Interviewed on 19 July 2013 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
8
 The PSC is the AU organ with the mandate to address peace and security issues in Africa. 
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The issue of CIAC has been the subject of numerous research, books, reports, news articles 
and programmes. Most of the literature is written by UN agencies and international 
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) focusing on presenting the plight or lived experience 
of children and their initiatives to provide them with protection, mostly in post-conflict 
situations. Literature on CIAC has predominantly focused on child soldiers to the neglect of 
other groups of children whose wellbeing is affected by armed conflicts. A seminar report by 
the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR)9 entitled Children and Armed Conflicts in Africa 
argues that: “[t]he frequent emphasis on child soldiers has the potential to dilute the efforts 
made on other critical aspects of the impact of armed conflict on children” (2007, p.16).  
 
At the international level, the first global effort to comprehensively document the impact of 
armed conflict on children was a 1996 report entitled Impact of Armed Conflict on Children by 
Graça Machel10. It set the international agenda for action on the issue and led to some 
institutional changes within the UN to address the problem (See Chapter 2). In addition to 
confirming that there were more than 300,000 child soldiers in the world at the time - a figure 
initially reported by the Coalition to End the Use of Child Soldiers (now Child Soldiers 
International)11- the report also highlighted the fact that armed conflicts violate every right of a 
child from their right to life to the right to be with their family or community (Machel 1996). In 
2001, a book by Machel entitled The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: A critical review of 
progress made and obstacles encountered in increasing protection for war-affected children 
provided an analysis of progress made 5 years on. She recognized that progress had been 
made in setting international norms and standards for protection of CIAC however Machel 
(2001) observed that children continued to face the same types of abuses and vulnerabilities 
which showed a “collective failure” of the international community. UNICEF‟s 2009 report - 
that was mentioned earlier - reviewed progress made on CIAC a decade after Machel‟s 1996 
report (UNICEF 2009). It recognized that not enough attention was being given to other 
                                                          
9
 Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) is a pan-African not-for-profit organization based in Cape Town, South 
Africa. 
10
 Former Minister of Education of Mozambique, member of The Elders, international advocate for women‟s and 
children‟s rights, and widow of Former South African President Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela. 
11
 Child Soldiers International (CSI) is a human rights organization advocating for an end to the use of child 
soldiers. 
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impacts of armed conflict on children aside from recruitment into armed groups including lack 
of access to education, health care, and water and sanitation (Ibid). The report also pointed 
out that in order to address the issue of CIAC greater consideration would have to be given to 
the changing nature of conflicts which were more intrastate than interstate and the adoption of 
non-traditional forms of warfare by armed groups was inflicting greater violence on children 
and other vulnerable groups. A 2012 report by Child Soldiers International (CSI) entitled 
Louder than words: An agenda for action to end state use of child soldiers found that children 
were being recruited into armed forces of more than 20 UN member states. What makes it 
different from other reports is that it included a checklist that governments could use to ensure 
that children were not recruited by armed forces or state-allied armed groups (Child Soldiers 
International 2012).   
 
Literature has also been published that focus particularly on protection of CIAC in Africa while 
some discuss the issue as part of a general discourse on children‟s rights. At a more general 
level, a 2004 book by Dr Rachel Murray12 entitled Human Rights in Africa: From the OAU to 
the African Union examined the role of the Organization of African Union (OAU) and its 
successor the AU in dealing with human rights issues on the continent including children‟s 
rights.  It provided insights into the decision making processes in the AU with regards to 
human rights. A seminar report by CCR (2007) summarized outcomes of a regional seminar 
on “Strengthening the African Union Framework for the Protection of Children Affected by 
Armed Conflict” that was held in April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa. It provided 
information on international and regional (AU) mechanisms for the protection of CIAC in Africa 
and discussed some opportunities and challenges that existed at the time to addressing the 
issue. A book entitled Children’s Rights in Africa: A Legal Perspective - edited by Prof. Julia 
Sloth-Nielsen13 and published in 2008 - provided a volume of essays on major themes in the 
discourse on children‟s rights in Africa (Sloth-Nielsen 2008). It included one written by Dr 
Benyam Dawit Mezmur14 entitled Children at Both Ends of the Gun: Child Soldiers in Africa in 
which he discussed the international legal framework for the protection of children from 
recruitment by armed forces or groups. A report by the AU Department of Social Affairs 
                                                          
12
 Professor of International Human Rights Law at the University of Bristol, United Kingdom. 
13
 Professor of Law at the University of Western Cape, South Africa. 
14
 Chairperson of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (July 2010-July 2015). 
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entitled The State of Africa’s Children Report 2010 reviews progress made by AU member 
states in meeting their commitments to ensure children‟s rights and wellbeing including their 
protection in armed conflicts. Though the literature mentioned above is by no means an 
exhaustive list of everything written regarding CIAC it illustrates the discourse on the issue. A 
review of literature indicated that very little has been written regarding the role of the AU and 
its various organs in the protection of CIAC.  
 
Research Problem 
 
The AU is a regional organization that is increasingly taking up more and more responsibility 
for peace and security in Africa. At the time of writing there are ongoing armed conflicts in 8 
AU member states and these are high on the AU‟s agenda. Violations and abuses against 
children‟s rights during armed conflict is an issue of peace and security. Given the gravity of 
the situation of CIAC in Africa and the fact that children make up about half of the continent‟s 
population it seems that addressing this issue is a test of the AU‟s commitment to ensuring 
peace and security and protecting human rights15. This study investigates whether the AU has 
the capacity to protect CIAC. It contributes towards addressing the dearth of literature 
regarding the role of the AU in this area. 
 
Definition of Key Concepts 
 
The definitions of key concepts listed below have been borrowed from the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) and a UNICEF document entitled Introduction 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Definition of key terms (UNICEF s.a.). For the 
purpose of this study the following definitions will apply: 
 
Child. “[A] child means every human being below the age of 18 years” (African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990) 
 
                                                          
15
 See Articles 3 (e) and (h) of the AU Constitutive Act. 
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Children in Armed Conflicts. Children in armed conflicts (CIAC) refers to children (see 
definition above) affected by any type of armed conflict be it interstate or intrastate in nature. 
 
Child Soldier. A child soldier is any child under the age of 18 who is recruited by an armed 
group or armed forces to take a direct part in hostilities. 
 
Member State. A member state is any country that has ratified the Constitutive Act of the AU 
to become a member of the organization.  
 
State Party. “A „State party‟ to a treaty is a country that has ratified or acceded to that 
particular treaty, and is therefore legally bound by the provisions in the instrument” (UNICEF 
s.a.). 
 
Research Methodology  
 
Conducting research on the role of the AU - a relatively new organization launched in 2002 – 
in protection of CIAC is challenging as there is a dearth of literature on the subject. Given this 
challenge, this study was guided by a literature review, interviews with key informants and 
grounded theory as its research methodology. The latter was discovered in the 1960s by two 
American sociologists, Barney G. Glaser16 and Anselm L. Strauss17, in 1967 during their 
collaborative work on medical sociology in California, U.S.A. In his book entitled Research 
Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches John W. Creswell18 points 
out that:  
 
Grounded theory [is a strategy], in which the researcher attempts to derive a general, 
abstract theory of a process, action, or interaction grounded in the views of participants 
in a study. This process involves using multiple stages of data collection and the 
refinement and interrelationship of categories of information (2002, p.16). 
 
                                                          
16
 Founder of the Grounded Theory Institute. 
17
 Before his death on 5 September 1996 he was Professor Emeritus at the University of California, San 
Francisco.  
18
 Professor of Educational Psychology at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. 
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The main purpose behind grounded theory methodology (GTM) is to generate theory that is 
grounded in data. In other words it adopts a bottom-up approach to research rather than 
trying to apply theory to data. This is not to say that the latter approach is wrong but rather 
GTM seemed more suitable for this study given that there is little literature on the subject. 
According to classical GTM, a research question should itself emerge from the research 
process or from main concerns of study participants. A divergence over this point emerged 
between Glaser and Strauss especially when the latter published a book in 1990 with Juliet 
Corbin19 entitled Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures and techniques. 
In their book entitled Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Melanie Birks20 and Jane Mills21 
explained that: 
 
Strauss and Corbin's assertion in their 1990 text that the research question be narrow 
and function to establish boundaries to the research was a key element in the 
'emergence versus forcing' debate that underpinned Glaser's (1992) subsequent 
rebuttal. Glaser's (1998) stance is based on his belief that for a problem to be of 
relevance, it must come from those for whom it has significance (Birks and Mills 2011, 
p.20).  
 
This study deviates from classical GTM in that the author had established a broad research 
question before undertaking field work that served to limit the scope. Another deviation is that 
a preliminary review of literature was carried out to assess general knowledge on the subject 
and to establish the significance of the study. In addition to this, interview protocols were 
established before conducting field work; a practice discouraged by classical grounded 
theorists (Ibid). These methodological choices were made in the interest of time as this study 
is a Master‟s thesis and given the fact that extensive field work in Africa with multiple stages 
of data collection would have been too expensive.  
 
GTM was also selected as it allows for an in-depth analysis of the research problem through 
repeated and transparent examination of data.  In their book entitled The Sage Handbook of 
                                                          
19
 Lecturer at San Jose State University, School of Nursing, USA, and Adjunct Professor at the International 
Institute for Qualitative Research, University of Alberta, Canada. 
20
 Professor of Nursing Services, College of Healthcare Sciences at the James Cook University, Australia. 
21
 Adjunct Professor in the College of Healthcare Sciences at the James Cook University, Australia. 
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Grounded Theory, Anthony Bryant22 and Kathy Charmaz23 argue that: “[one of the key 
strengths of grounded theory] is that it offers a foundation for rendering the processes and 
procedures of qualitative investigation visible, comprehensible, and replicable” (2007, p.33). 
This study selectively uses essential methods of GTM including its processes of inductive 
coding of data and analysis to generate a theory. Two methods of data collection that were 
used were a literature review and in-depth interviews with key informants. According to GTM‟s 
inductive process, analysis of interviews precedes a literature review as the latter is informed 
by findings from the former. In an article entitled In-depth Interviewing: The process, skill and 
ethics of interviews in peace research, Karen Brounéus24 argues that: “when firmly based on 
and compared with previous research, that is when it [an in-depth interview] is put into the 
realm of the „collective enterprise‟ of science, an in-depth interview study can suggest valid 
descriptive or causal inferences” (cited in Höglund and Öberg 2011, p.131).  The approach of 
using different sources of information was selected in order to analyze the discourse on the 
subject from a broader perspective.  
 
Interviews 
 
In-depth interviewing of key informants was selected as one of the data gathering methods for 
this study to gain an understanding of complexities of the subject again given the little 
knowledge that exists. Brounéus observes that: “in-depth interviewing offers a unique method 
and source of information since it provides research with depth, detail and perspective on a 
certain research question, and at a certain moment in time” (Ibid, p.131). Purposive sampling 
was employed to identify key informants to seek multiple and diverse perspectives and to see 
how these relate to each other as well as with the literature. The key informants for the in-
depth interviews were selected based on their knowledge of or active involvement in 
contemporary initiatives and/or past initiatives related to the protection of CIAC. The following 
is an alphabetical list of the key informants: 
 
                                                          
22
 Professor of Informatics at Leeds Metropolitan University, United Kingdom. 
23
 Professor of Sociology at Sonoma State University, USA. 
24
 Lecturer at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand. 
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 Ayalew Legesse Yesuph [Child Protection Assistant Coordinator, Ethiopia Program, 
International Rescue Committee] 
 Catherine Wanjiru Maina [Senior Social Worker, Secretariat of the African Committee of 
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child]  
 Chikezie Anyanwu [Pan African Program Specialist, African Union Liaison & Pan Africa 
Program Office; Plan International]  
 Daniel Tefera [Lecturer in the Department of Psychology at Addis Ababa University and 
Deputy Chair of the General Assembly of ANPPCAN (The African Network for the 
Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect) Ethiopia Chapter]  
 Francis Onditi [Regional Child Protection Project Coordinator, Save the Children East 
Africa Regional Office] 
 Franco Wandabwa [Advocacy Director, Africa Area Office, Save the Children] 
 Mary [Pseudo] [Staff member of an international organization] 
 Jean François Basse [Child Protection Adviser, Department of Peace and Security, 
African Union Commission] 
 Matthias Wevelsiep [Adviser on ICT for statebuilding, Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)]  
 Michael [Pseudo] [Staff member of a regional organization] 
 Shimelis Tsegaye, PhD [Head of the Child and the Family Programme, The African Child 
Policy Forum (ACPF)]  
 Solomon Dersso, PhD [Head of the Peace and Security Council Report, Institute for 
Security Studies (ISS)] 
 Tiruneh Sinnshaw [Retired staff member of UNICEF and currently Public Health 
Consultant]  
 Vincent Ochilet [Deputy Head , International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to the 
African Union]  
 
The UNICEF Liaison Office to the African Union and UN Economic Commission for Africa and 
two persons working for international organizations (who requested anonymity) had also 
participated as key informants for this study. Interviews were semi-structured to allow for open 
two-way communication to elicit detailed information on the subject. To avoid placing 
constraints on information that emerged from interviews questions were designed to be broad 
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and open ended. Open-ended questions encouraged respondents to talk more extensively 
about the subject matter which is useful when using GTM as everything is based on the data 
and what emerges from its analysis. After the in-depth interviews were transcribed coding 
was carried out to analyze data. 
 
Coding Process 
 
Coding involved highlighting and labeling data which was later used for creating conceptual 
categories. Bryant and Charmaz (2007) say that: “incidents articulated in the data are 
analysed and coded, using the constant comparative method, to generate initially substantive, 
and later theoretical categories” (p.266). Before data was used to generate a theory, it went 
through a back-and-forth process of coding and analysis until a higher level of abstraction 
was reached and core categories could form parts of an overall theory. Prior to coding, audio 
recordings of interviews were transcribed and each transcript was read and a memo kept to 
record first impressions. This was followed by a process of substantive coding which Bryant 
and Charmaz define as “the process of conceptualizing the empirical substance of the area 
under study: the data in which the theory is grounded” (Ibid, p.275). The first step under this 
process was open-coding where data was deconstructed into conceptual categories or 
building blocks of a theory. Through line-by-line reading of data, pertinent information such as 
relevant words, phrases, sentences or sections were highlighted and labeled. This 
assessment of data was carried out to ensure that no important information was left out that 
could potentially make the theory less relevant.  
 
After open-coding, codes were compared in order to identify gaps in data which guided further 
search for information. New codes were created by combining two or more similar codes and 
these were then grouped into categories. From the constant comparison and analysis of 
codes and categories further delimitation of data lead to the emergence of a core category. 
According to Bryant and Charmaz, “the core variable [category] reoccurs frequently in the 
data and comes to be seen as a stable pattern that is increasingly related to other variables” 
and “it relates meaningfully and easily with other categories” (Ibid, p.280). Once the core 
category was identified, selective coding was carried out where the literature review was 
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delimited to only data relevant to the core category and related categories. Through this 
process categories that formed part of the emerging theory were saturated. They were then 
compared and assessed to identify connections which formed the core of the theory.  
 
Literature Review 
 
As mentioned earlier, a preliminary literature review was conducted to assess general 
knowledge on the subject and to establish the study‟s significance. A second and more in-
depth literature review was carried out after coding and analysis of data from interviews. This 
was done through a process of triangulation which according to GTM improves the validity of 
the processes used. Data related to the protection of CIAC in Africa were sought from 
different sources including: 
 
1. AU Headquarters  
2. Institute of Security Studies (ISS) 
3. University for Peace, Africa Programme 
4. The African Child Policy Forum (ACPF) 
5. Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) 
6. Save the Children Finland 
7. Tampere University Library (Main Library) 
8. Library of the Finnish Parliament 
9. Helsinki University Library (City Centre Campus Library) 
10. Academic and multilateral papers 
11. The Internet 
 
Delimitations 
 
The author acknowledges that there are many important issues related to protection of CIAC 
in Africa including the role of the family, community, houses of religious worship, traditional 
leaders, and the private sector among others. Although these issues were not included in the 
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research design, questions for in-depth interviews with key informants were designed in a 
way that would allow for them to emerge.  
 
Ethical Consideration 
 
There were minimal ethics considerations for this study as it was based on a literature review 
and in-depth interviews with key informants who are not classified as vulnerable people. As 
per principles of ethical research, interviewees were informed of their right to anonymity and 
requested for permission to use their words as part of the study.   
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Chapter 2 Understanding the institutional and legal framework for the protection of 
children in armed conflicts in Africa 
 
2.1. International Norms and Institutions  
 
International norms for the protection of CIAC exist and have influenced how the issue is 
perceived in the African Union (AU) and by its member states. A worldwide movement 
initiated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to address the problem of 
civilian deaths in armed conflicts culminated with the passing of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 - known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL) - and later their two Additional 
Protocols in 1977. The Geneva Conventions are universal with every country in the world as a 
signatory including South Sudan - the newest country in the World - which acceded on 16 
July 2012. While the first, second, and third Geneva Conventions focused on protection of 
combatants and prisoners of war, the fourth provides for protection of civilians who are not 
participants to hostilities, including women, children, and the elderly. The fourth Geneva 
Convention includes provisions for children‟s need to access food, clothing, and medicine and 
to be reunited with their families. In addition to this, IHL makes provisions for children to be 
separated from adults during detention, and provided access to education. However, in an 
online article entitled Armed Conflict: the Protection of Children under International Law 
Carolyn Hamilton1 and Tabatha Abu El-Haj2 argue that: “children are not a focus of the 
[Fourth Geneva] Convention. Indeed, they are barely recognized as a separate group and are 
treated as only one segment of the vulnerable part of the civilian population (Hamilton and El-
Haj, s.a.). Dr Benyam Dawit Mezmur on his part argues that: “[provisions of the fourth Geneva 
Convention] fall short of addressing the protection of child soldiers specifically” (Mezmur 
2008, p.200).  
 
Though these treaties were primarily focused on international conflicts, they all have a 
common Article 3 that provides for protection of non-combatants whether in international or 
non-international conflicts (Machel 1996). Dr Mezmur points out that weaknesses of 
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Research and International Programmes, Coram Children‟s Legal Centre. 
2
 Associate Professor of Law, Thomas R. Kline, Drexel University. 
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Additional Protocol II include: “its failure to establish any measures of implementation or 
supervision to ensure compliance with its provisions and the requirement of a higher degree 
of intensity for its application (as it does not apply to riots or to isolated and sporadic acts of 
violence which have not reached the level of internal armed conflicts)” (Mezmur 2008, p.201). 
He further argues that most armed conflicts in Africa are intrastate and therefore not covered 
by Additional Protocol II. In total, IHL has 25 provisions for the protection of CIAC. For 
example towards addressing recruitment of child soldiers, Article 77 of Additional Protocol I 
states that: „[t]he Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children 
who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in 
particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces‟. This means that 
special protection needs of children between the ages of 15 and 18 were not recognized. The 
United Nations Security Council has the authority to enforce the Geneva Conventions and 
their Additional Protocols and can refer cases of violations to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). 
 
International criminal law is another legal framework with an influence on how CIAC is 
considered by the African Union (AU). The Rome Statute of 1998 - that established the ICC in 
The Hague - refers to recruitment of children under the age of 15 into national armed forces 
or armed groups - whether in international or non-international armed conflicts - as a war 
crime. Similarly to IHL, a weakness of the Rome Statute is its exclusion of children between 
the ages of 15 and 18. There are 34 AU member states that are parties to this treaty and its 
establishment was supported by the OAU. At the time of writing, the ICC is trying to bring 
those responsible for war crimes to book. For example, in February 2006 it charged Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo - founder of the Union of Congolese Patriots militia group in the DRC - with 
war crimes including recruitment of children under the age of 15. The ICC has also issued an 
arrest warrant for Joseph Kony - leader of the Lord‟s Resistance Army (LRA) - for 33 counts 
of war crimes including recruitment of children under 15 to take part in hostilities. However he 
and other LRA members - that the ICC has issued warrants for - continue to remain at large. 
On 26 September 2013, the ICC upheld a ruling by the Special Court for Sierra Leone that 
found President Charles Taylor of Liberia guilty of war crimes, including the recruitment of 
child soldiers, and sentenced him to 50 years in prison. This ruling was a landmark for 
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international efforts to bring to account those accused of recruiting children to participate in 
hostilities.  
 
The ICC has however been accused of unfairly targeting African countries with most of its 
current cases being against people from the continent. It more recently attracted controversy 
by charging the sitting President of Kenya, Mr. Uhuru Kenyatta, and his Deputy William 
Samoei Ruto with crimes against humanity during post-election violence in 2007-08. It was 
controversial to the extent that an extraordinary session of the AU Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government (AU Assembly) was held on 12 October 2013 to deliberate on the 
issue. The decisions and declarations of the session stated that: “[T]o safeguard the 
constitutional order, stability and integrity of [AU] Member States, no charges shall be 
commenced or continued before any International Court of Tribunal against any serving AU 
Head of State or Government or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity during their 
term of office” (African Union 2013a). This AU decision will affect the ICC‟s as well as regional 
(AU) courts‟ effectiveness in addressing the issue of recruitment of child soldiers in Africa 
among other war crimes. It is telling that AU Heads of States and Government can find the 
time and resources to meet for this purpose while they have never had a summit that was 
fully dedicated to children‟s rights. This suggests that there are challenges related to priority 
setting in the AU which is discussed further in Chapter 3. 
 
Aside from international criminal and humanitarian law, special assistance and protection for 
CIAC is also recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UHDR) (1948)3, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966)4 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)5 (1966). The ICESCR and 
ICCPR are binding international treaties. In an article entitled Child Well-Being: Children’s 
Rights Perspective Prof. Jaap Egbert Doek6 explains that “[c]hild-specific provisions within the 
two covenants [ICESCR and ICCPR] were limited to the right to protection and assistance” 
(cited in Ben-Arieh et al 2014, p.191). Machel (1996) points out that though these treaties are 
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not child-specific, other rights that apply to children include “the right to life, the right to 
freedom from slavery, torture and arbitrary arrest” and “the right to food, clothing, housing, 
health and education” (p.50). Though protection of children has been provided for through 
IHL, international criminal law, and the above mentioned human rights treaties, there still 
remained a need to establish international norms that specifically recognized vulnerable 
groups of people, including women and children. The United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) is an international treaty that specifically focuses on children‟s 
rights, including their right to protection.  
 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
The CRC is the most widely ratified UN Convention and it sets out the human rights of 
children and obligates States Parties to ensure and respect them. In an article entitled A 
theoretical analysis of the reality of children’s rights in Africa: An introduction to the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Amanda Lloyd-Purvis7  explains that “[the 
CRC] is the first international instrument with a specific focus on the protection of the child as 
such, recognizing children as human beings of equal value” (2002a, p.12). It was adopted by 
the UN General Assembly in 1989. With the exception of South Sudan and Somalia, the CRC 
has been ratified by all other African countries. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
is the treaty body mandated to monitor implementation of its provisions and States Parties are 
required to provide it with periodic information on the implementation of CRC. They are 
expected to submit an initial report two years after ratifying the CRC and one every five years 
thereafter. Many AU member states have submitted first and second periodic reports to the 
CRC Committee and close to half have submitted third and fourth periodic reports. To have a 
comprehensive overview of implementation of CRC in signatory countries, this Committee 
also invites international, regional and national civil society organizations (CSOs) to submit 
alternative reports. The purpose of these reports is not to challenge those submitted by 
governments rather they point out areas not covered in the latter that require greater attention 
towards comprehensively addressing children‟s rights issues. On the basis of State Party and 
alternative reports, the CRC Committee issues its concluding observations that set out 
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recommendations on how states can improve their compliance with CRC and its optional 
protocols. Though the CRC Committee does not have a follow-up procedure at the national 
level to monitor implementation of its concluding observations, it coordinates and is informed 
by National Human Rights Institutions, CSOs, and UN agencies on the ground. 
 
The CRC includes provisions for protection of CIAC. According to Article 38, „States Parties 
shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 
fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities‟. Recruitment of children for military service 
was the subject of much debate during the drafting of CRC as a number of countries held 
reservations over the age limit of 18. A seminar report by CCR says that: “[the CRC] did not 
articulate the issue of the use of child soldiers in the strong and enforceable terms required by 
the scale of its malpractice in Africa” (2007, p.14). Though a compromise was reached to set 
the age limit at 15 in the CRC, disagreements over this issue later led to adoption of the first 
Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict (OPAC) by the 
UN General Assembly in 2000. It obligates States Parties to ensure that no child under 18 is 
recruited to participate in hostilities. To date OPAC has been signed by over 100 countries 
and adopted by the majority of AU member states. The AU adopted a Memorandum of 
Understanding in July 2002 that promoted the ratification of the Optional Protocol by its 
member states. According to a CD-ROM prepared by the African Child Policy Forum (ACPF) 
entitled Child Law Resources Volume II: The Reporting Status of African States, “[OPAC] has 
been ratified by 39 African states and 9 states have only signed it” and “a total of 11 states 
that ratified the treaty have submitted initial state party reports” (ACPF 2012). This low 
number in reporting makes it difficult for the CRC Committee to monitor the situation of CIAC 
in Africa. To date the AU member states that have not signed OPAC include Equatorial 
Guinea, Guinea, Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe, and South Sudan. Those that have 
signed but not ratified the Protocol include Central African Republic (CAR), Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Somalia, and Zambia. ACPF (2013) says that children below the age 
of 18 can be recruited into armed forces with parental consent in Congo Brazzaville, Kenya, 
Malawi, Seychelles and Sao Tome and Principe. Regarding challenges facing implementation 
of OPAC, the  AU Department of Social Affairs says that: “[challenges include] widespread 
overdue state reporting, the substantial gap between state obligations and the status of their 
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children, and the limited enforceability of compliance with established children‟s rights by 
states parties” (African Union 2010b, p.16). This suggests that some countries may be signing 
such international treaties with no real intentions of actually implementing them. 
 
Though the CRC has been widely ratified in Africa how relevant is it to protection of CIAC on 
the continent? In an article entitled Paper Protection' Mechanisms: Child Soldiers and the 
International Protection of Children in Africa's Conflict Zones Prof. David J. Francis8 argues 
that “[i]nternational legal instruments [including the CRC] designed to protect children in 
conflict zones, and in particular in Africa's complex political emergencies, are of limited 
relevance” (2007, p.209). He says that these instruments have a “Western-centric” definition 
of childhood which is incompatible with African traditional and cultural perspectives (Ibid). As 
will be discussed further below, this was one of the main reasons why the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) decided to adopt an African instrument for children‟s rights. In a book 
entitled The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child: A socio-legal perspective, 
Dr Thoko Kaime9 points out that: “[n]o less than 70 state parties have entered reservations or 
declarations, some of which attempt to subject CRC under the various religious, cultural or 
traditional observations current in the concerned jurisdictions” (2009, p.16). The CRC, like 
most international legal instruments, is subject to interpretation at national levels hence 
governments can pick and choose which parts are compatible with local context and dismiss 
those that are not. Prof. Francis (2007) posits that international criminal law and other 
instruments designed to protect CIAC have little relevance as most post-conflict countries in 
Africa have been unable to domesticate them. He also observes that the CRC focuses only 
on the actions of States Parties while ignoring the reality that many conflicts in Africa are civil 
wars involving non-state actors hence making it irrelevant to addressing child protection under 
such circumstances (Ibid). 
 
Another weakness of the CRC until recently was that it did not provide for a mechanism 
through which children could submit complaints to its Committee on violations of their rights 
including those committed during armed conflicts. The Optional Protocol to the CRC on a 
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Communications Procedure - which only came into force on 14 April 2014 with the ratification 
of 10 countries - is an instrument designed to addresses this shortcoming. It provides children 
or groups of children with a mechanism through which they or their representatives can 
submit complaints on violations of their rights. They can be submitted regarding violations of 
the CRC and all its optional protocols, including that on involvement of CIAC in hostilities. It 
also establishes an inquiry procedure for grave or systematic child rights violations. The 
caveat is that their country must be a State Party to this Optional Protocol and they have to 
exhaust all legal remedies within their country before submitting a complaint. It is too early to 
tell whether this Optional Protocol has been effective or not. Another international framework 
for protection of CIAC is the Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with 
Armed Forces or Armed Groups (Paris Principles). 
 
Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups  
 
Towards operationalizing efforts to address the specific issue of child soldiers, an 
international conference entitled Free children from war was held in Paris, France in February 
2007. The conference concluded by issuing the Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children 
Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups also referred to as the Paris Principles. 
According to the website of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on Armed Conflict, the Paris Principles marked the culmination of discussions among 
representatives from 76 UN member states towards providing “guidelines on the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all categories of children associated with 
armed groups” (Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Armed 
Conflict s.a.). In a report entitled Child Protection in African Union Peace Support Operations: 
Contextual Analysis Save the Children and the International Bureau for Children‟s Rights 
(IBCR) explain that: “[The Paris Principles] provide that all children associated with armed 
actors should be considered primarily as victims of violations of international law, not 
perpetrators” (2014, p.11). They also state that many African states are party to these 
principles. The African Union‟s Department of Social Affairs states that: “[The Paris Principles] 
provide a helpful framework for enacting collective commitments and for giving sounder effect 
to obligations within the ACRWC [African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child] and 
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the CRC OPAC, and this needs AU attention to options for supporting country-level strategic 
planning” (African Union 2010b, p.102). A major weakness of the Paris Principles is that it is 
not binding. Despite the existence of these common principles, many countries have different 
interpretations of who is considered to be a child soldier especially those with established 
traditions of recruiting children between 15 and 18 years of age into armed forces. This 
means that OPAC provides a greater opportunity to hold governments to account for 
protecting children from recruitment into armed forces or groups. A key actor working at the 
international level on the issue of CIAC is the UN Special Representative to the Secretary 
General on Children and Armed Conflict. 
 
Special Representative to the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict 
 
In 1996, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/51/77 establishing the 
mandate of the Special Representative to the Secretary General on Children and Armed 
Conflict and this decision was based on recommendations in the earlier mentioned 1996 UN 
report by Graça Machel on the impact of armed conflict on children. The Special 
Representative‟s principle mandate is to promote and protect the rights of all children affected 
by armed conflict - not just child soldiers - and to work towards ending the impunity of those 
who commit grave violations against them. It also includes monitoring and promoting 
documentation on the state of CIAC and using the information for advocacy activities at 
international, regional and national levels. The Special Representative also works to foster 
international cooperation on the issue. On 17 September 2013, the Special Representative - 
in partnership with UNICEF - signed an agreement with the Peace and Security Department 
(PSD) of the AU Commission to collaborate on protection of children affected by armed 
conflict in Africa. In a joint press release entitled The United Nations Working Together with 
the African Union to Protect Children in Armed Conflict Special Representative Leila 
Zerrougui stated that: “as the African Union is taking a larger role in the continent‟s mediation 
and peacekeeping operations, it had become essential to make our partnership stronger” 
(African Union and Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children 
and Armed Conflict 2013). In his 2014 report to the Security Council on Children in Armed 
Conflict, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon said that: “[t]hrough the expert advice of a child 
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protection specialist, the [AU] Peace and Security Department, with the support of the Office 
of my Special Representative and UNICEF, is working to develop guidance and mainstream 
child protection in the policies and activities of the African Union” (Secretary General Report 
2014, p.5). It is too early to tell what impact this initiative will have on how the issue of 
protection of CIAC is considered by the AU. The United Nations Security Council is another 
UN body that has put this issue high on its agenda. 
 
The United Nations Security Council 
 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is mandated by the UN Charter to ensure 
international peace and security and CIAC is an issue that has featured high on its agenda. A 
seminar report by CCR states that: “the UN Security Council‟s involvement in children 
affected by armed conflict has helped to uncover the political and security dimensions of an 
issue that had previously been tackled largely as a humanitarian concern” (2007, p.20). In 
1999, it reached an agreement that violations and abuses against children during conflict 
is a peace and security issue.  Since then the UN Secretary General has presented an 
annual report on the issue to the UNSC which has passed five resolutions on children and 
armed conflict including Resolutions 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000), 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003), 
1539 (2004), 1612 (2005), and 1882 (2009). CCR (2007) points out that: “[CIAC] is now 
included in the Security Council‟s fact-finding missions and in many country-specific reports. 
Child protection is also now part of the mandate of all UN peacekeeping missions, and 
peacekeeping personnel are trained to be sensitive to the needs of children in situations of 
armed conflict” (Ibid, p.20). Resolution 1612 called for a Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 
(MRM) managed by country task forces to end impunity of parties to a conflict by gathering 
information on violations of international child protection standards. In the foreword to a report 
by Ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sablière10 entitled Security Council Engagement on the 
Protection of Children and Armed Conflict: Progress Achieved and the Way Forward, Ms. 
Radhika Coomaraswamy11 says that: “[Resolution 1612] provides the framework for Security 
Council engagement on the issue of children and armed conflict” (Sablierѐ 2012, p.4).The 
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MRM is expected to report on six grave violations against children identified in UN Security 
Council Resolution 1539 namely: 
 
1. Killing or maiming of children 
2. Recruitment or use of child soldiers 
3. Rape and other forms of sexual violence against children  
4. Abduction of children 
5. Attacks against schools or hospitals 
6. Denial of humanitarian access to children  
 
Resolution 1612 led to the establishment of a Security Council Working Group on Children 
and Armed Conflict to consider reports of the MRM on which it bases its actions. It has the 
mandate to request other UN bodies to support the implementation of this resolution.  
 
The Security Council Working Group and the MRM system have however not been without 
their challenges principally among which is a lack of intervention capability. Ambassador 
Sablière (2012) argues that: “the difficulty to target those who continue to commit abuses 
weakens the whole system” and “the architecture [of the MRM system] is fundamentally 
based on dialogue but it has often been found that it could not succeed with recalcitrant 
individuals and groups unless there was a credible threat of sanctions” (p.23). In his article 
entitled Supporting the UN Security Council in Applying its Thematic Agendas to its Country - 
Specific Work Swen Dornig12 argues that: “[t]he poor record of the Security Council in 
mainstreaming its thematic agendas [including CIAC] into its country-specific work is mainly 
caused by a lack of capacity, rather than by a lack of political will” (2014, p.1). He further 
explains that this lack of capacity in UN Missions is due to a low number of staff and 
insufficient resources to implement requirements set by the UNSC‟s CIAC agenda. This 
shows that though it is playing a lead role in putting the issue on the international agenda, the 
UNSC continues to face the challenge of ensuring its Resolutions related to protection of 
CIAC are implemented within the UN system. The challenge going forward will be to go 
beyond naming and shaming of groups who commit such acts to intervening in conflicts 
based on a need to protect children. What type of intervention and whether or not the Security 
Council will engage other actors are separate questions that are both beyond the scope of 
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this study. However it seems that a consensus is lacking within the UNSC on whether or not 
an intervention can be made on the basis of reports it receives through its MRM system. In 
sum, despite efforts of its working group on children and armed conflict to keep the issue high 
on the international agenda, ending impunity of groups and individuals who commit abuses 
against children continues to be a challenge at the global level. 
 
Besides the UNSC, Chapter 8 of the UN Charter encourages settlement of „local disputes‟ 
through regional arrangements or regional agencies before referring them to the Council. It 
calls on the latter to encourage the development of regional arrangements for conflict 
resolution. Lloyd (2002a) points out that “[t]he UN General Assembly has affirmed the value of 
regional agreements to promote and protect human rights, as regional treaties are best 
placed to consider and resolve their own human rights situations, whilst upholding cultures, 
traditions and histories unique to the region” (p.14). One such arrangement with which the 
Security Council has over the past years worked increasing closely with is the African Union 
(AU). The AU Peace and Security Council states that: “Africa continues to dominate the 
agenda of the UN Security Council, and is host to more peacekeeping or peace support 
operations than any other continent” (African Union 2013d, p.2). The following section will 
discuss institutional and legal frameworks for the protection of CIAC that apply to AU member 
states. 
 
2.2. Regional (African Union) Norms and Institutions 
 
On 9 July 2002 the AU replaced the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The latter was 
founded with the principle aims of freeing Africa from colonial rule and promoting economic 
integration among its member states. Priorities and paradigms underpinning the OAU and AU 
are different as they were established at different times and influenced by events in other 
parts of the world. Samuel M. Makinda13 and F. Wafula Okumu 14, in their book entitled The 
African Union: Challenges of globalization, security, and governance, say that: “without the 
type of changes that took place after the Cold War, it would not have been possible for 
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African states to establish the AU” (2008, p.27). The 1980s and 1990s witnessed many armed 
conflicts in Africa that were mostly intrastate however some did spill over to neighboring 
states such as in the cases of conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC). During these years there were many coup d’états that posed a challenge to 
OAU in terms of whether or not it should recognize a government that comes to power 
through such unconstitutional means. Unlike the OAU, the AU has adopted a zero-tolerance 
policy to the overthrow of governments through violent or unconstitutional means. The OAU 
had a policy of non-interference in affairs of its member states which affected its effectiveness 
including its ability to address human rights violations, such as the recruitment of children to 
participate in hostilities. In an article entitled The African Union: Concepts and Implementation 
Mechanisms Relating to Human Rights Advocate Bience Gawanas15 argues that: “by 
adopting an unconditional position on non-interference, the OAU became ineffective in the 
promotion and protection of human rights in a decolonized and free Africa” (cited in Bӧsl and 
Diescho 2009, p.137). Despite this paradigm shift by AU towards a zero-tolerance policy coup 
d’états have occurred in recent years in Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, 
Madagascar, and Mali. The organization has adopted an interventionist policy where „grave 
violations of human rights‟ and „crimes against humanity‟ may warrant military intervention16. 
Such interventions do however require a mandate from the UNSC as was the case with the 
civil war, military coup and de facto secession in Mali in 2012.  
 
Among the challenges faced by the AU since its establishment, resource/budgetary 
constraints have been a major problem - mainly as a result of member states defaulting on 
their membership payments. Writing in 2008, Makinda and Okumu pointed out that: “while the 
OAU had an annual operating budget of $30 million, the AU‟s is conservatively estimated at 
$500 million” 17 and “it is still being figure out where the AU will get this money to run its 18-
plus organs” (2008, p.58). They argued that the AU‟s inability to raise adequate funds from its 
member states made it dependent on donor funding raising concerns over its ability to act 
independently. According to an online article entitled African Union seeks financial 
independence by the international news network Aljazeera, on 23 May 2013 the AU Executive 
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 AU Commissioner for Social Affairs (2003-2012). 
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 See Article 4 (f) of the AU Constitutive Act. 
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Council adopted a budget of $380 million for 2014 and a large percent of these funds came 
from the US, European Union and China (Aljazeera 2013, May 24). The current AU 
headquarters – which cost $200 million to build – is a gift from China to the organization. The 
impact of resource constraints on the functionality of the AU with regards to its efforts to 
protect CIAC is discussed further in Chapter 3. 
 
The AU has established institutions with a human rights remit and protection of children‟s 
rights has garnered increasing attention on its agenda since the 1970s. On 20 July 1979, the 
OAU adopted the Declaration on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child in Monrovia, 
Liberia with the aim of institutionalizing protection of children‟s rights. Francis Onditi18 says 
that this Declaration came about from recognition of the devastating impact that armed 
conflicts taking place in West Africa at the time were having on children. In July 1996, the 
OAU Council of Ministers adopted a Resolution of the Plight of African Children in Situation of 
Armed Conflicts in which they strongly affirmed that „the use of children in armed conflicts 
constitutes a violation of their rights and should be considered as war crimes‟. Despite this 
expression of political will, it took 20 years for OAU to adopt and operationalize a binding 
instrument on children‟s rights, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACRWC).  
 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
 
The ACRWC is a regional instrument that sets out the human rights of children in Africa - 
including the right to protection from armed conflicts - and obligates States Parties to ensure 
and respect them. It was adopted by OAU in 1990 and came into force on 29 November 
1999. It has been ratified by 47 out of 54 AU member states. Murray (2004) argues that it took 
nine years for the ACRWC to come into force because many member states - without reading 
the fine print - assumed that it was no different from the CRC hence they did not see it as 
having any added value. At the time of writing, 7 countries that have yet to ratify it include: 
Central African Republic (CAR), DRC, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Somalia, Sao 
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 Francis Onditi (Regional Child Protection Project Coordinator, Save the Children East Africa Regional Office) 
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Tome and Principe, South Sudan and Tunisia. At the time of writing, armed conflicts are 
taking place in 4 of these countries. South Sudan has signed but not yet ratified the 
instrument. The ACRWC was the result of a number of factors including growing advocacy by 
child-focused nongovernmental organizations for a regional instrument and minimal 
participation of African states in the drafting of the UNCRC. Tiruneh Sinnshaw19 points out 
that the international community, including UNICEF, had played a role in advocating for a 
regional instrument for children‟s rights. The ACRWC includes issues of particular importance 
in the African context relating to children that were found to be missing in CRC including 
female genital mutilation, duties or responsibilities of the child, children and apartheid, and 
compulsory minimum age for military service. Dr Kaime (2009) observes that: 
 
[T]he African Children‟s Charter‟s insistence on African traditions and civilisation 
should not be construed as a misplaced plea for a romantic rendition of some 
hegemonic African culture that existed in the past, but rather as a testament to 
the changing nature of both rights and culture and the recognition that the two 
concepts can be used to reinforce and complement each other (p.172). 
 
The ACRWC is not opposed to CRC rather both instruments are complementary to each 
other in that they provide a framework to holistically address children‟s rights issues in Africa. 
This study will not go into the debate over which instrument provides greater protection for 
children as that is beyond the scope of this research and has been covered well by other 
studies (See Lloyd 2002a, Sloth-Nielsen 2008). 
 
Similarly to the CRC, ACRWC includes provisions for the protection of CIAC. One among 
other reasons why it was adopted was because OAU member states wanted to set a 
compulsory minimum age for recruitment of children into armed forces at 18 and not 15 as is 
the case with CRC. Article 22 (2) of ACRWC states that: „[States Parties] shall take all 
necessary measures to ensure that no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and refrain in 
particular, from recruiting any child‟. It also calls on them to „respect and ensure respect for 
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rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts which affect the child‟. As 
the ACRWC defines a child as anyone under the age of 18, this provision makes it 
compulsory on States Parties not to recruit children below this age for military service. Doek 
explains that “[a]n African state that has ratified both the CRC and the ACRWC must apply 
the more comprehensive article 22 of the ACRWC” (2014, p.192). Francis Onditi20 observes 
that the legal framework for protection of CIAC embedded in the ACRWC clearly shows the 
AU‟s commitment on this issue. However one could argue that commitment lies more in the 
actions of member states rather than just their signing of legal treaties. Despite the ACRWC‟s 
provision for a minimum age for recruitment into armed forces, defining who is a child soldier 
is highly political and there are gray areas with national legislations having different 
interpretations. State Parties to this instrument are also obliged to protect CIAC - whether 
they are of an international or non-international nature. Furthermore, a seminar report by CCR 
points out that: “[the ACRWC] further reflects African realities by extending the scope of 
protection under the treaty to children in situations of internal armed conflicts, tension, and 
strife” (2007, p.15). 
 
The ACRWC‟s provisions for CIAC are however not without their shortcomings. In an article 
entitled Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the 
African Committee of Experts: Raising the gauntlet Lloyd points out that: “the most major 
substantive omission in the Children‟s Charter [ACRWC] is the fact that, unlike Article 39 [of 
the] CRC, it fails to promote the physical and psychological recovery and social integration of 
a child victim of armed conflict” (2002b, p.184). In addition to this, the 223rd Meeting of the AU 
Peace and Security Council issued a briefing note entitled Mitigating Vulnerabilities of Women 
and Children in Armed Conflicts which states that: “[i]n terms of the mechanisms aimed 
specifically to address the plight of children in armed conflicts, the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child overlooks the critical role that non‐state actors play in the 
violation of children‟s rights during armed conflicts” (African Union 2010a, p.6). This is a 
shortcoming considering the fact that a review of the UN Secretary General‟s annual reports 
to the UNSC on children and armed conflict show that many more non-state armed groups 
than state armed forces are listed as actors who commit grave violations against CIAC. 
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The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) is the 
treaty body mandated by the AU to promote, monitor and ensure enforcement of ACRWC. 
The AU Department of Social Affairs points out that „children associated with armed forces 
and armed groups‟ has been a priority issue on the Committee‟s agenda (African Union 
2010b, p.18). CIAC was one of the thematic areas discussed at its first session (Lloyd 2004). 
The ACERWC consists of 11 members nominated by States Parties and elected by the AU 
Executive Council21 to serve one five-year term each. According to Article 33 of ACRWC, 
Committee members should have „competence in matters of the rights and welfare of the 
child‟ and „shall serve in their personal capacity‟. Governments are required to submit an 
initial report on implementation of the ACRWC to the Committee two years after ratification 
and once every three years after that. In its report to the 21st session of the AU Executive 
Council in July 2012, ACERWC stated that “there has been slowness in the reporting of its 
[ACRWC] implementation as required by Article 43 of the Charter” (African Union 2012, p.1). 
After reviewing a report the Committee issues concluding observations - in which it advises 
State Parties on changes that need to be made to better implement ACRWC - and follows up 
on this. Similarly to the CRC Committee, ACERWC invites international, regional, and 
national CSOs to submit alternative reports in order to have a comprehensive overview of 
implementation of ACRWC. It also receives communications on violations of children‟s rights 
from States Parties, CSOs, and children. Communications can be submitted to the Committee 
as long as the complainant is unable to find a remedy through national legal systems. 
However the fact that these decisions are non-binding negatively affects the effectiveness of 
the Committee and calls have been made for a judicial mechanism to address this problem. In 
principal it can undertake an investigative mission based on communications after which a 
State Party is given a hearing and a decision is issued. However in practice many member 
states have been unwilling to  allow for such missions. 
 
The ACERWC faces logistical and financial challenges. The OAU-AU transition process 
posed budgetary challenges for newly established institutions like the ACERWC (Murray 
2004). For example, despite the AU‟s obligations to establish a Secretariat for this Committee, 
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this was not realized until mid-2007, six years from the time the first ACERWC members were 
elected. As a result of inadequate funding from the AU, ACERWC for many years had to 
depend on donations from outside sources (especially UNICEF) that came with their own 
conditions. Until 2013 ACERWC received it‟s funding from the budget of the AU 
Commission‟s Department of Social Affairs where its Secretariat was based raising questions 
over its independence. At the time of writing, it has an autonomous budget and a Secretariat, 
be it small. Chapter 3 discusses these and other challenges currently faced by the Committee 
and how this affects its ability to ensure protection of CIAC. Prior to the adoption of ACRWC, 
protection of children‟s rights was addressed more generally through the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples‟ Rights (ACHPR).   
 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The ACHPR is a regional instrument that officially put the protection of human rights - 
including the protection of women‟s and children‟s rights - on the OAU/AU agenda when it 
was adopted in 1981 and later came into force in 1986.  In accordance with Article 30 of the 
ACHPR, the OAU established an African Commission on Human and People‟s Rights (the 
African Commission) in 1987 with 11 experts and a headquarters in Banjul, The Gambia.  It is 
mandated to promote, monitor, and ensure enforcement of the ACHPR. States Parties are 
required to submit a report to this Commission on the implementation of the ACHPR every 
two years. It issues decisions based on these reports as well as those from National Human 
Rights Institutions and CSOs. However, Makinda and Okumu (2008) argue that: “major 
weaknesses of the Charter [ACHPR] and the Commission are that they lack enforceable 
remedies and mechanism(s) for encouraging and ensuring state compliance with the 
Commission‟s decisions” (p.47). With regards to children‟s rights, Article 18 (3) of ACHPR 
calls on States Parties to „ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as 
stipulated in international declarations and conventions‟. This gives the African Commission a 
broad remit over human rights issues affecting children, including protection of CIAC. 
However, Murray (2004) argues that: 
 
Although the OAU organs paid some attention to children, their rights remained 
neglected for many years as they were generally not seen to be within the scope of the 
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African Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights in Banjul while it awaited the 
adoption of the additional Charter on the Child [ACRWC] and the appointment of its 
Committee (2004,  p.163).  
 
The AU Department of Social Affairs quotes a 2010 evaluation report on the ACERWC which 
states that: “the African Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights has not been evidently 
attuned to the rights of children in its Charter or in its deliberations” (African Union 2010b, 
p.120). The relationship between the African Commission and ACERWC will be further 
explored in Chapter 3. The former has Special Rapporteurs who deal with specific human 
rights issues including its Special Rapporteurs on the Rights of Women and on Refugees, 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Migrants and Asylum Seekers who both have mandates 
that include protection of CIAC. In support of this, a seminar report by CCR points out that 
they: “can effectively deal with issues particular to African children such as the specific impact 
of armed conflict on girls; post-conflict peacebuilding and the reintegration of girls previously 
associated with armed forces; as well as issues of child refugees, family reunions, and the 
protection of non-accompanied children” (2007, p.22).  Given the gravity of the situation of 
CIAC in Africa, as described in Chapter 1, the absence of a Special Rapporteur dedicated to 
the issue of CIAC or child rights in general seems to be a shortcoming of the African 
Commission. Similarly to the ACERWC, the ACHPR‟s decisions and recommendations are 
non-binding and for many years this was a barrier to effective enforcement of human rights 
which led to calls for a judicial mechanism with powers to make such binding decisions, 
hence the establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights (the African 
Court).  
 
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The African Court is an AU legislative body that can have a significant influence on the 
protection of CIAC. It has jurisdiction over all cases and legal disputes related to interpretation 
and application of all human rights-related instruments that have been ratified by AU member 
states. Although it was established in 1998 - through an additional protocol to the ACHPR – 
the African Court only entered into force about 6 years later on 25 January 2004. It consists of 
11 judges and is based in Arusha, Tanzania, thousands of miles away from the African 
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Commission in the Gambia. A web page on the Open Society Justice Initiative22 website 
entitled Fact Sheets: African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights points out that the protocol 
establishing this Court has only been ratified by 26 out of 54 AU member states (Open 
Society Justice Initiative 2013, June). The long wait to establish the Court and the fact that 
about half of AU member states have yet to ratify its Protocol indicates its contentious nature. 
This seems to be influenced by the fact that its decisions are final and binding unlike 
ACERWC and the African Commission. The Protocol did not include ACRWC as part of its 
jurisdiction. A 2010 report by Save the Children Sweden and Plan International23 entitled 
Advancing Children’s Rights: A Guide for Civil Society Organizations on how to engage with 
the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child argues that: “there is 
a strong case for arguing that the ACERWC is an African Intergovernmental Organisation and 
as such capable of submitting a case” (2010, p.87)24. Decisions of the African Court can be 
enforced by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AU Assembly) which gives 
it political clout to influence the AU agenda. This is therefore an ideal platform for promoting 
the protection of CIAC. However, this supposes that political will on the part of AU member 
states exists to implement the African Courts decisions which may not be the case given the 
fact that 28 countries are not parties to its Protocol and recent efforts to curtail its powers 
such as the declaration that no sitting Head of State may be tried for any crimes. 
 
The future of the African Court at the moment is uncertain as an AU Summit of Heads of 
State and Government in July 2004 decided to merge it with the Court of Justice of the 
African Union - the main judicial organ of the AU - to form one Court, the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR)25. The new court has yet to be established as its Protocol 
has only been ratified by 5 out of 54 AU member states (as of February 2014) which indicate 
the amount of time and advocacy required before it is realized (see African Court Coalition 
2014, July 12). The rationale for merging the two Courts was to ensure efficiency, avoid 
duplication of efforts and overlapping of jurisprudence, and to reduce costs of operating two 
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organization based in the U.S.A - which works on litigation, advocacy and research on human rights abuses.   
23
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Courts with similar mandates (Murray 2004, Sloth-Nielson 2008). The Protocol for the ACJHR 
stipulates that it will consist of 16 judges with an equal geographical representation from all 
regions of Africa.  
 
The ACJHR seems to have benefited indirectly from the earlier mentioned controversies 
surrounding the ICC‟s targeting of a sitting African Head of State. On 12 October 2013, an 
extraordinary session of the AU Assembly decided that it was important to „fast track‟ efforts 
to expand the capacity of ACJHR in order for it to have the capacity to try cases of genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity - essentially becoming the African equivalent of the 
ICC. The fact that actions by the ICC indirectly led to calls for greater support for an AU 
initiative and that an extraordinary session was held to decide on this issue illustrates how 
institutions like ACJHR depend on political will of member states to function. Whether the 
controversy over jurisdiction of ICC persuades more AU member states to adopt and ratify the 
Protocol on ACJHR is left to be seen. The Protocols for the African Court on Human and 
Peoples‟ Rights and ACJHR both state that nongovernmental organizations or individuals 
cannot petition them without the consent of the government under question. This shows a 
lack of political will by member states to allow for a human rights system that can assure 
accountability for human rights violations. Another AU institution that has an important role to 
play in the protection of CIAC is its Peace and Security Council (PSC).  
 
The AU Peace and Security Council 
 
The PSC is the AU organ with the mandate to address peace and security issues on the 
continent, including CIAC. Since the launch of the AU, peace and security has been a major 
area of work for the organization26. According to the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of 
the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the PSC is „a standing decision-making 
organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts‟ and „the PSC shall be a 
collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to 
conflict and crisis situations in Africa‟. It consists of 15 members elected by the AU Executive 
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Council with 5 serving for 3-year terms and the remaining 10 for 2 years. Elections are 
designed to ensure equitable representation of all regions of Africa. The PSC is supported to 
carry out its mandate by a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African 
Standby Force (ASF) and a Special Fund. Collectively these bodies make up the African 
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). In its report to the 21st Session of the AU Assembly, 
the PSC stated that: “[i]n spite of the progress achieved so far, the APSA has not yet been 
fully operationalized” and “the inability of the AU to intervene in Mali in mid‐January 2013, to 
counter the offensive then launched by the criminal and terrorist groups against the positions 
of the Malian army, is indicative of the long way we still have to go” (African Union 2013d, 
p.3). These comments are in reference to challenges faced in establishing the ASF through 
collaboration with Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Where do CIAC feature in 
APSA? Is the ACERWC involved in the work of bodies under APSA? Chapter 3 will attempt to 
address these and other questions on how protection of CIAC features in the work of APSA. 
The PSC also has a Secretariat that operates as a division within the African Union 
Commission‟s Peace and Security Department (PSD) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
 
The PSC Protocol requires that human rights are mainstreamed in the work of all AU 
organs27. In an article entitled A critical appraisal of the PSC’s mandate with respect to human 
rights, Dr Solomon A. Dersso28 explains that: “[the PSC Protocol] can be considered both as 
mandating and demanding AU institutions, particularly the PSC and its supporting bodies, to 
integrate human rights into all their conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict-
resolution initiatives and processes fully and appropriately” (cited in Murithi and Lulie 2013, 
p.202). The Protocol also gives PSC the mandate to monitor the state of CIAC and oversee 
their reintegration into society in post-conflict situations. According to a seminar report by the 
CCR: 
 
[T]he PSC has a mandate to undertake peacebuilding activities through such 
programmes as the reintegration of child soldiers, the resettlement and reintegration of 
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refugees and internally displaced persons, and assistance to vulnerable persons, 
including children (2007, p. 23). 
 
The fact that human rights are part of PSC‟s mandate can, on its own, be considered as an 
opportunity to address the plight of CIAC. However, on the PSC‟s track record on dealing with 
human rights issues, Dr Dersso (2013) observes a gap between its mandate and 
implementation on the ground and says that: “[PSC‟s] approach to issues of human rights in 
the context of a crisis has not been systematic” (Ibid, p.210). On the issue of CIAC, the 364th 
Meeting of the PSC stated that: “whilst the necessary instruments for the protection of women 
and children in armed conflict and for the promotion of their rights exist, the pace of 
implementation of those instruments is deplorably slow. Council accordingly, called for their 
full implementation” (African Union 2013b, p.1). This indicates the PSC‟s support for AU‟s 
human rights instruments. Chapter 3 will discuss the relationship between PSC and 
ACERWC as well as other AU bodies with a mandate related to protection of CIAC. Though 
PSC is a principal organ of the AU‟s work on peace and security, it cannot make the final 
decision to intervene in an armed conflict even for humanitarian reasons. It first has to make a 
recommendation to the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government which is the only 
organ that can authorize an intervention. This differs from the UN structure where the UN 
Security Council has decision making power even though the veto powers of its permanent 
members is more often than not used to challenge calls for military interventions. The 
relationship between the PSC and AU Assembly once again reinforces the importance of 
political will of member states.  
 
The AU Executive Council and the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government  
 
The AU Executive Council and the AU Assembly are at the apex of the AU organogram. The 
former consists of Ministers - usually Ministers of Foreign Affairs. It decides on reports, 
decisions, and recommendations made by ACERWC, the African Commission, as well as all 
other AU treaty bodies and organs. The ACERWC submits a report on all its activities to the 
Executive Council which in turn presents it to the AU Assembly. In its report to the 21st 
Session of the Executive Council ACERWC said that:  
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[It] is requesting the Executive Council to urge countries that have not yet 
ratified the Charter and those that have not submitted their reports on the 
implementation of the Charter to accelerate the process. The Executive Council 
should further urge Member States to respond positively to Committee requests 
to undertake field missions” (African Union 2012, p.8).  
 
This signifies both the political clout of the Executive Council and the challenges faced by 
ACERWC in getting member states to submit reports and agree to its investigative field 
missions. Any decisions by the Executive Council to support the implementation of the 
ACERWC‟s mandate can only be enforced by the AU Assembly. The latter is therefore the 
supreme decision making organ of the organization. Lloyd on her part argues that: “the 
African Children‟s Charter fails to state what the Assembly should do with them [ACERWC 
recommendations]” (2002a, p.26). The AU Assembly is also the only body with the authority 
to enforce judgments of the African Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights, including those 
related to children‟s rights. This structural configuration for decision-making means protection 
of CIAC is highly dependent on political will of AU member states. Two organs of the AU with 
political clout to influence decision-making at the AU Assembly level are the AU Commission 
and the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC). 
 
AU Commission and Permanent Representatives Committee 
 
The Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) plays an important role in setting the AU 
agenda and hence one that can influence how much attention is given to the issue of CIAC. It 
works under the instruction of the Executive Council and is made up of member state‟s 
Ambassadors accredited to the AU. It is responsible for preparing the program of work of the 
Executive Council and as it is made up of Ambassadors it is instrumental in linking the AU 
agenda with that of member states.  
 
Another organ that can influence where CIAC lies on the organization‟s agenda is the AU 
Commission that serves as the Secretariat of the organization.  It is charged with carrying out 
all operational matters of the AU including following up on implementation of decisions of 
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other organs of the organization. It is made up of a Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, eight 
Commissioners and staff members. The Commissioners manage different portfolios of the AU 
Commission including Peace and Security, Political Affairs, and Social Affairs. The AU 
Commission is charged with promoting harmonization between policies and programmes of 
the AU and RECs. With regards to its work on human rights, Gawanas points out that: “in 
carrying out their mandates, all portfolio Departments in the AU Commission are required to 
mainstream human rights into their programmes; therefore, the issue of human rights is no 
longer limited to the African Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights” (2009, p.155).  
Aside from the AU, another regional framework for protection of CIAC is RECs. 
 
Regional Economic Communities  
 
RECs are sub-regional organizations that serve as regional trading blocs as well as a 
mechanism for coordinating social, political, and military integration. Some RECs were 
established before the OAU was set up while others evolved independently from the latters‟ 
involvement. The AU recognizes 8 RECs that are by and large based on geography of 
different regions including: 
 
1. Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 
2. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
3. Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) 
4. East African Community (EAC) 
5. Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
6. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
7. Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) 
8. Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
 
Article 16 of the PSC Protocol states that: „Regional Mechanisms are part of the overall 
security architecture of the Union‟. However, Makinda and Okumu argue that: [t]he 
uncontrolled establishment of RECs has created serious inefficiencies, duplication, 
unintended overlap, and even dissipating efforts and scarce resources that should be frugally 
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directed towards the goal of building an effective African Union” (2008, p.53). RECs are 
however playing an increasingly critical role in APSA in terms of anticipating, preventing or 
mediating conflicts within their respective regions. They also play a role in protection of CIAC. 
According to a seminar report by the CCR: 
 
[RECs] such as ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] and SADC 
[Southern African Development Community] have begun to implement the 
commitments that they have made to children in the context of their own peacekeeping, 
peacemaking and peacebuilding initiatives. At the SADC level, for instance, a Protocol 
on Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials was adopted in 2001 
and has the potential to contribute to the protection of children in war-affected societies 
(2007, p.25). 
 
The PSC states that: “relations with the Regional Economic Communities/Regional 
Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RECs/RMs) have not yet 
reached the degree of harmony and coordination prescribed by the PSC Protocol” (African 
Union 2013d, p.3). The PSC‟s efficiency greatly depends on the level of coordination it has 
with RECs. This relationship will influence whether or not the former will be successful in 
dealing with human rights issues such as protection of CIAC. 
 
This chapter has shown that an institutional and legal framework exists for the protection of 
CIAC in Africa and that there is a consensus that children need special protection in these 
situations. It is evidently clear that political will of member states plays a crucial factor in the 
functionality of the AU as is the case with other regional organizations. Equally important is 
whether or not the AU has the institutional and structural capacities to address the issue of 
protection of CIAC, the subject of the following chapter.  
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Chapter 3 Does the AU have the capacity to protect children in armed conflicts? 
 
The existence of institutional and legal frameworks is not enough to ensure the protection of 
children in armed conflicts (CIAC) in Africa. Based on an analysis of data from in-depth 
interviews with key informants and literature using grounded theory methodology (GTM) this 
study found that the AU lacks the institutional and structural capacity to protect CIAC and a 
determining factor is a lack of political will among many of its member states to deal with the 
issue. The theory developed from this study‟s findings is that the AU‟s lack of capacity to 
protect CIAC is both a manifestation and a product of the issue not being high on its agenda. 
If the issue is at the apex of the AU‟s list of priorities, the organization‟s lack of capacity in this 
area would have to be addressed and violations of children‟s rights in armed conflicts would 
not be an afterthought. Putting this issue high on the AU agenda does not mean deprioritizing 
other issues such as terrorism or famine rather it should be considered as one among other 
critical factors to the success of its peace and security efforts. 
 
3.1. Children in Armed Conflicts and AU Priority Setting  
 
The AU lacks an agenda on CIAC and this is a major factor for why the issue is not among 
the organization‟s top priorities. One of the findings of this study is that there seems to be a 
problem with setting priorities in the AU as children‟s rights in general is seen as being of 
secondary importance. Tiruneh Sinnshaw1 suggests that: “what it [AU] does and how it 
behaves and how it perceives situations is almost how it is done in each country. It is the sum 
total of the behavior of each country that reflects itself in the AU”. This means that if there is 
lack of political will on the part of member states to address the issue it is unlikely that the AU 
will approach it any differently. Chikezie Anyanwu2 suggests that this could be addressed if 
protection of CIAC was high on the agenda of the AU Assembly which has the power to make 
the institutional changes needed. However, decision making at that level is highly political and 
Francis Onditi3 suggests that some countries use their contributions to the organization to 
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 Chikezie Anyanwu (Child Protection Adviser, Plan International) Interviewed on 17 July 2013 in Addis Ababa, 
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influence the agenda to cover up human rights violations including those committed against 
children.  Tiruneh Sinnshaw argues that there is “general inertia and ignorance” to the special 
needs of CIAC and this is preventing the AU from taking action on the issue. Chikezie 
Anyanwu agrees and points out that the organization has no information about how children 
are being affected by conflicts in Africa including those in Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) or Central African Republic.  At the Second Pan-African Forum on Children held in 
Cairo, Egypt from 29 October-2 November 2007, Ministers of AU member states responsible 
for children‟s rights and wellbeing issued a Call for Accelerated Action on the Implementation 
of the Plan of Action Towards Africa Fit for Children (2008-2012) which states that „[they 
request the] AU to develop an additional protocol to the ACRWC on elimination of 
involvement of children in armed conflict‟. At the time of writing – which is 7 years from when 
this request was made - no such additional protocol exists. The AU Department of Social 
Affairs argues that this additional protocol should be a priority issue for the AU and ACERWC. 
In addition of this, it argues that: “neither instrument [ACRWC and the CRC‟s Optional 
Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict] sufficiently addresses the core 
elements of post-conflict actions and peace-building efforts and the protection of children on 
the one hand and their effective participation on the other” (2010b, 115). Another challenge 
related to priority setting in the AU is that protection of CIAC has not been integrated in to its 
peace and security agenda. 
 
The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) - the lead body in the African Peace and Security 
Architecture - has not integrated protection of children as part of its work on peace mediation, 
conflict management and peace building. Dr Dersso (2013) argues that there is a gap 
between its mandate and implementation in that human rights have yet to be mainstreamed 
into its activities. In June 2012, the AU Executive Council issued decisions EX.CL/Dec.712 
(XXI) which requested „the Permanent Representative Committee (PRC), the Peace and 
Security Council (PSC) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to take into account 
the rights of the child in their agenda and cooperate actively with the Committee [ACERWC]‟. 
Though such decisions can be considered as an opportunity, the use of words such as 
“requests” and “take into account” indicate that decision makers still do not appreciate the 
seriousness of the issue and the level of response it requires of them. Since 2013, PSC and 
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ACERWC have organized joint sessions to discuss collaboration around protection of CIAC 
and - at the time of writing - efforts are underway to institutionalize their relationship. Though 
this can be said to provide an opportunity to put this issue on the peace and security agenda, 
it is too early to tell what progress has been made as it is a new initiative and it takes time for 
changes to be effected within a bureaucratic and political organization such as the AU. Dr 
Solomon Dersso4 suggests that: “[t]here is a need to develop systematic guidelines for 
ensuring that issues of children‟s protection are included and are adequately reflected 
whenever the African Union and the Peace and Security Council designs mediation efforts, 
peacemaking initiatives, [and] whenever the AU deploys peace support operations”. Such an 
approach may however prove difficult at the moment as the AU has a more reactionary 
approach to addressing conflicts rather than a proactive one that equally invests in 
prevention. 
 
Compared to child rights, there has been greater success in integrating gender-related issues 
on the AU agenda. According to a press statement of its 364th meeting, the PSC commended 
the AU Commission for its work on gender mainstreaming in its Peace and Security 
Department (PSD) (African Union 2013e). It also stated that: “[r]esponsibility for the 
implementation of a gender policy must be diffused across the organization structure, rather 
than concentrated in a small central Unit” (Ibid, p.2). For protection of CIAC to be realized, 
children‟s rights in general should be similarly diffused in the AU rather than everything being 
shouldered by the ACERWC with 11 members and 5 Secretarial staff. The AU Peace and 
Security Council (PSC) holds an annual open session on the situation of women and children 
in situations of armed conflict where it discusses these issues with other AU bodies, 
international organizations, and CSOs. However a review of PSC press statements on these 
sessions indicates that discussions are primarily on addressing violence against women and 
gender mainstreaming in the AU with little attention being given to specific issues of children‟s 
vulnerabilities and protection. They also show that there is a tendency to group women and 
children‟s issues together which shows a lack of appreciation for the special needs of the 
latter. There was an instance where a member of ACERWC complained to organizers of one 
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 Solomon Dersso, PhD (Head of the Peace and Security Council Report, Institute of Security Studies) 
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of these sessions for not inviting the Committee5. Mary [pseudo]6 says that there are some 
officials within the AU who do not know that the ACERWC even exists. This point to another 
challenge which is a lack of synergy between AU bodies with mandates that include 
protection of CIAC, which is further discussed later in this Chapter. Another challenge that 
prevents this issue from being high on the AU agenda is structural weaknesses. 
 
3.2. Structural Weaknesses  
 
The AU lacks a structure to deal with the issue of CIAC and this militates against it being high 
on its agenda. One structural weakness can be found in its practice of building new 
institutions with human rights mandates instead of strengthening those that already exist such 
as the ACERWC. Gawanas agrees and argues that: “the AU continues to create more 
instruments and mechanisms with limited resources and overlapping jurisdictions, thus 
limiting their role in providing effective oversight and enforcement” (2009, p.161). This means 
that bodies such as the ACERWC have to compete for resources with new institutions and 
there is an increased likelihood of a duplication of efforts. A press statement of an open 
session during the 434th meeting of the PSC held on 8 May 2014 on the theme of Children in 
Armed Conflicts in Africa: Briefing by the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) states that: “[p]articipants and Council [PSC] recommended 
the appointment of an AU Special Envoy for Children in Africa to sustain efforts in the 
protection of children‟s rights in the context of armed conflict on the continent” (African Union 
2014b, p.3). This title suggests a broader mandate than just a focus on CIAC which begs the 
question of how much attention can he/she give to this issue with competing priorities such as 
education, health, water and sanitation, harmful cultural practices, among others. As 
compared to the ACERWC this Special Envoy would work under the Chairperson of the AU 
Commission giving him/her greater access to decision makers and a permanent presence at 
AU Headquarters.  The AU‟s decision on this recommendation will be an indication of the 
level of importance it gives to children‟s rights in general. The AU Commission Chairperson 
already has a Special Envoy for Women, Children, and Armed Conflicts, Bineta Diop, 
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however in practice her work is mainly focused on promoting women‟s rights and gender 
mainstreaming in the AU. The fact that this position already exists could be grounds for the 
AU to reject the appointment of another Special Envoy for children. Hence it will be a test of 
the synergy and cooperation between PSC and ACERWC in that they will have to jointly 
advocate for the position with the AU Executive Council. Ultimately this initiative could fail 
without political backing from member states especially if some consider it to be a tool for 
exposing their failures in the area of child rights. 
 
Given the situation of CIAC in Africa and poor levels of child wellbeing in general, addressing 
these issues seems to be too much to ask of a Committee of 11 members and a Secretarial 
staff of 5. Tiruneh Sinnshaw7 suggests that given the fact that children make up more than 30 
percent of Africa‟s population the AU needs to establish a child rights department. He argues 
that: “what lesser role can such an organization [AU] play than have something in the 
forefront and specifically charged to look into the situation of children, to protect them, to 
advocate for their rights, education and survival”. The AU Commission has a Directorate of 
Women, Gender and Development which has been able to designate gender experts in the 
AU Commission‟s Peace and Security and Political Affairs Departments in an effort to 
promote gender mainstreaming. Similarly, given political will of the AU Assembly, a 
Department for Children‟s Rights could be established. This is not to suggest that this would 
be a panacea to all problems rather it would provide the AU with the structure that has been 
lacking so far to address children‟s rights issues, including protection of CIAC. 
 
Another opportunity to address the AU‟s structural deficiencies would be for the PSC to learn 
from the UN Security Council which set up a dedicated working group on CIAC, issued 
resolutions and is ensuring that the issue is integrated in the UN‟s peace and security 
operations. In support of this, Article 8 of the PSC Protocol states that: „[t]he Peace and 
Security Council may establish such subsidiary bodies as it deems necessary for the 
performance of its functions‟.  Franco Wandabwa8 suggests that: “measures that the AU can 
take in the protection of children in armed conflict are that issues of protection of children in 
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armed conflict are deliberately integrated within its peacekeeping and post-conflict redress 
docket. That is not the case right now”. Similarly, the issue has yet to be integrated into the 
AU‟s conflict prevention mechanisms - including its conflict early warning system - and more 
generally in the modus operandi of APSA (African Peace and Security Architecture). A closely 
related challenge is a lack of synergy between AU bodies. 
 
A lack of synergy exists among AU human rights bodies and between them and other 
institutions with a mandate to ensure protection of CIAC. Article 42 of the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) mandates the ACERWC to „cooperate with 
other African, international and regional institutions and organizations concerned with the 
promotion and protection of the rights and welfare of the child‟. The PSC is among these 
institutions that it can cooperate with. Catherine Wanjiru Maina9 says that: “[the Peace and 
Security Department] had been requested to invite the Committee [ACERWC] when they go 
to areas of post-conflict but that has not happened”. Chikezie Anyanwu10 says there is little 
synergy between the AU‟s Continental Planning Element of the African Standby Force - which 
is charged with planning and managing AU peace support operations - and the ACERWC as 
well as other human rights bodies. Save the Children Sweden and Plan International (2010) 
on their part suggest that:  
 
The Committee [ACERWC] should be encouraged to work with the different units of the 
PSC on issues around the prevention of conflict, monitoring of the rights of children 
caught up in armed conflict, supervision of child reintegration processes and promotion 
of child rights within regional peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction processes 
(p.94). 
 
As mentioned earlier, PSC and ACERWC have prepared a plan of action on how to 
collaborate better for protection of CIAC however as this only began in 2013 it is too early to 
assess what impact this has made. Jean François Basse11 on his part says that: “[t]he need to 
institutionalize this collaboration remains critical” and “[i]t is for this reason that this plan of 
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action will be of significant importance, particularly in ensuring that these two institutions 
increase their collaboration in a more formalized way”. Greater synergy through 
institutionalized collaboration between ACERWC and APSA - particularly the PSC - could 
contribute to putting protection of CIAC high on the AU agenda, which may ultimately result in 
greater security for them.  
 
Challenges of lack of synergy also exist with the African Standby Force (ASF). In a 2014 
report entitled Child Protection in African Union Peace Support Operations: Contextual 
Analysis Save the Children and the International Bureau of Children‟s Rights (IBCR) observe 
that: “the lack of coordination between peace support operations (PSO) actors remains a 
problem” and “this is particularly the case in the Eastern and Western African sub-regions, 
where the operationalization of the standby forces has not yet led to a corresponding 
reduction in children exposed to abuse and rights violations” (2014, p.4). This means that the 
ASF is not yet prepared to address protection of CIAC. The lack of structure in the AU to 
address CIAC is preventing the issue from being high on its agenda and this will not change 
unless there is an openness to review and reform institutional frameworks. 
 
Problems of synergy also exist between the African Commission on Human and Peoples‟ 
Rights (African Commission) and the ACERWC. Recommendations by the Forum on the 
Participation of NGOs in the 50th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples‟ Rights (ACHPR) and 24th African Human Rights Book Fair 12 stated that: “[they are] 
deeply concerned that despite ACHPR Resolution 144 in 2009 calling for greater 
collaboration between the African Commission and the ACERWC, this has not been 
effectively implemented to yield results for the children on the African continent” (African 
Centre for Democracy and Human Rights13 2011, October 31). At the time of writing, the 
ACERWC is drafting a collaboration plan and harmonizing its rules of procedure with the 
African Commission and the African Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights however as this is 
still in the planning stages it is yet unclear what type of framework will emerge and whether it 
addresses the above concerns raised by the Forum on Participation of NGOs. In an article 
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entitled How to guarantee credence: Recommendations and proposals for the African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Lloyd points out that: 
“[a]lthough, the two bodies [ACERWC and ACHPR] are independent, close collaboration will 
ensure that issues relating to children will be dealt with expediently and with the requisite 
support from all human rights institutions” (2004, p.37). Though such initiatives can improve 
general synergy between these human rights bodies, an AU structure for addressing CIAC is 
still lacking and this relates to the earlier mentioned challenge of setting priorities. 
Furthermore, these initiatives can only be sustainable if there is political backing from member 
states for a stronger and more efficient human rights system. Chikezie Anyanwu14 agrees and 
argues that: “it should go all the way high up in the AU decision making structure with regards 
to ensuring that synergy and alignment is a modus operandi of the AU”. He further points out 
that without a change of direction from the apex level, AU bodies with a mandate to ensure 
protection of CIAC will work in silos and be “territorial”. The AU‟s structural weaknesses to 
address the plight of CIAC are linked with challenges of resource and capacity constraints.  
 
3.3. Resource and Capacity Constraints 
 
Resource and capacity constraints have been a persistent dilemma ever since the AU was 
established (Makinda and Okumu 2008). It negatively affects ACERWC‟s overall 
effectiveness, including its capacity to advocate for protection of CIAC to be high on the AU 
agenda15. A briefing note of the PSC‟s 223rd Meeting states that: “[ACRWC] fails to include 
mechanisms that ensure that member states mobilize resources to ensure that children‟s 
rights are protected. This has proved a challenge for the African Committee [ACERWC] which 
has been plagued by insufficient funding” (African Union 2010a, p.6). However one could 
pose the question as to whether member states would have ratified a treaty with such a 
mechanism for mobilizing resources? Furthermore, given member states track record of not 
submitting state party reports to the ACERWC it is difficult to imagine that they would make 
such a commitment. The AU Department of Social Affairs on its part reports that: “[ACERWC] 
operates under conditions of insufficient resources and weaker secretarial, policy and review 
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capacities” (African Union 2010b, p.18). Lloyd (2004) says that the AU has not fulfilled many 
commitments that it has made to support the work of the ACERWC.  She further argues that: 
“[t]he principal threat to the effectiveness, efficiency and credibility of the African Committee 
[ACERWC] is the action, or rather inaction, of the OAU/AU and the lack of resources being 
allocated” (2004, p.36).  
 
Chikezie Anyanwu16 suggests that low budget allocation by the AU for the ACERWC is a 
reflection of the level of importance the organization attaches to issues of children‟s rights. 
With budgetary constraints in the AU, the African Commission and ACERWC have had to 
compete over scarce resources. Gawanas (2009) observes that: “[g]iven the scarcity of 
resources [in the AU] and to avoid duplication of effort, the question always remains whether 
there will be adequate funding to ensure the effectiveness of all these mechanisms” (p.156). 
She also points out that some AU officials question whether there is a need to fund a 
separate child rights committee when the African Commission already exits (Ibid). This type of 
argument again illustrates the challenge of changing perceptions on the importance of 
children‟s rights and why it is difficult to put them high on the AU agenda. Chikezie Anyanwu 
argues that the AU allocates over 60 to 70 percent of its budget to its bodies working on 
peace and security while the ACERWC gets almost nothing. He further elaborates by saying 
that: “[i]t is on record that in the year 2012 there was no funding made available for even the 
statutory meeting of the African Committee on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. That 
shows you how much importance and priority African leaders and decision makers place on 
the Committee itself”. This once again illustrates a common thread in this study which is a 
lack of political will on the part of many AU member states to support work and advocacy on 
children‟s rights.  
 
The ACERWC was granted an autonomous budget in 2013 and this was achieved 5 years 
after the Executive Council instructed the AU Commission to take this action (see African 
Union 2011). Though this gives the Committee some sense of predictability, it continues to 
lack the resources it needs to effectively carry out its mandate. In a video recording of his 
                                                          
16
 Interview, 17 July 2013. 
50 
 
opening remarks to the 23rd Session of the ACERWC held from 9-16 April 2014, the 
Committee‟s Chairperson said that: 
 
Unfortunately, as far as our program budget for 2014 is concerned there are indications 
that we might not get it from the African Union. The Committee once again has to rely 
on the kind support from partners and in particular I would like to express the support 
provided by UNICEF, Plan International, Save the Children and ACPF in holding this 
session. However on a positive note, for the program [operational] budget of the 
Committee we have the contribution from member states which is not a significant 
amount but is a positive move in taking responsibility to the activities of the Committee 
in the foreseable future (African Union 2014, April 9). 
 
Such dependence on support from external actors may raise questions as to the ACERWC‟s 
credibility and independence. Without political will and adequate funding to support the 
ACERWC it cannot be effective in monitoring the situation of CIAC and advocating for their 
protection.  
 
The ACERWC lacks the capacity it needs to carry out its mandate - including ensuring 
protection of CIAC - and a lack of adequate resources is a major contributing factor in this 
regard. Chikezie Anyanwu17 argues that: “[t]here are 11 members [in the ACERWC] and we 
have 54 African countries. How do they expect 11 members to cover 54 African countries with 
only three dedicated staff? It‟s not possible”. It has a lean Secretarial staff of 5 people at the 
AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Francis Onditi18 observes that a lack of technical 
capacity in the ACERWC is “a limiting factor”. The AU Department of Social Affairs reported in 
2010 that the ACERWC had not addressed any of the communications - on violations of 
children‟s rights - submitted to it at the time including one that it received 5 years earlier 
regarding the Ugandan government‟s lack of response to the plight of children abducted by 
the Lord‟s Resistance Army (LRA).  Michael [pseudo]19 says that the Ugandan government 
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has used its influence in the AU Assembly to block the ACERWC‟s efforts to investigate the 
matter. Save the Children Sweden and Plan International (2010) observe that: 
 
The Committee conducted a fact-finding mission to Northern Uganda in 2005 which 
was presented by the AU Commission to the Executive Council, the Permanent 
Representatives Committee (PRC) and the AU Assembly. However the report was not 
published by the AU Assembly and therefore it was not widely disseminated or acted 
upon (p.76). 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 decisions or recommendations of ACERWC are not binding and 
this is a major barrier to the implementation of the ACRWC.  Gawanas (2009) criticizes 
human rights mechanisms in Africa as being “toothless”. As she served as AU Commissioner 
for Social Affairs for 9 years that seems to be enough time for her to assess the effectiveness 
of AU‟s human rights bodies.  
 
One opportunity to strengthen the capacity of ACERWC is that the AU Executive Council has 
been requested to allow for its members to serve more than one term and some have called 
for the position of Chairperson to be permanent (African Union 2014, April 920). This could 
help to ensure continuity of work and reduce the number of induction training sessions 
required for new members. However, appointment of Committee members - who are 
nominated by member states - is political hence this proposal may face some resistance in 
the Executive Council and AU Assembly. Another opportunity is an offer that has been made 
by the Government of Burkina Faso for the ACERWC to establish its headquarters there. 
Vincent Ochilet21 suggests that: “they [ACERWC] need to have a headquarters. It will not 
solve everything but if they had a headquarters it may help them to settle better”. Would this 
help to improve its synergy with the African Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights in 
the Gambia? At the time of writing, the ACERWC is conferring with the AU Commission on 
this offer.  
 
                                                          
20
 This was mentioned in a video recording of a s speech by the ACERWC Chairperson during the Committee‟s 
23rd Ordinary Session. 
21
 Interview, 19 July 2013. 
52 
 
Capacity constraints in AU bodies working on peace and security to effectively address 
protection of CIAC is a reflection of the low status that the issue is accorded on the AU 
agenda.  Chikezie Anyanwu22 argues that: “the entire Department of Peace and Security 
[PSD] of the African Union [Commission] has very limited capacity when it comes to child 
protection in situations of conflict and in emergencies and that is a fact”. The PSD has a lot of 
influence in setting the peace and security agenda as it is permanently based at AU 
headquarters and maintains close contact with member states while the PSC only meets for 
its statutory meetings and during crisis situations. Therefore this Department‟s lack of 
capacity in the area of protection of CIAC suggests that it is not high on its agenda and 
therefore not a priority in its advocacy activities. Similarly to ACERWC, the PSC faces 
capacity constraints in dealing with the issue of CIAC. In support of this, Save the Children 
Sweden and Plan International (2010) argue that: “[t]he PSC‟s knowledge of how conflict 
affects children is limited” (p.94)23. Furthermore, Save the Children and IBCR (International 
Bureau for Children‟s Rights) observe that: “[t]he Proposed Guidelines for the Protection of 
Civilians in African Peace Support Operations [led by the PSC], currently under review, make 
no specific mention of African or other legal frameworks explicitly focused on child protection 
or child‟s rights” (2014, p.11). This links to earlier mentioned challenges of setting priorities 
and synergy.  
 
Although AU peace support operations have guidelines on protection of civilians this has not 
achieved greater protection for children. The Africa led Intervention Support Mission to Mali 
(AFISMA) - the AU‟s intervention in the civil war, military coup and de facto secession in Mali 
that erupted in March 2012 - lacked the capacity and training to protect children during that 
crisis. According to Save the Children and IBCR (International Bureau for Children‟s Rights), 
“[a]s late as June 2013, no Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on how to deal with children 
affected by armed conflict were in place for any of the armed forces operating in Mali, nor had 
the Malian Armed Forces or AFISMA troops received substantial child protection training” 
(2014, p.10). They also argue that the Mali crisis showed that the African Standby Force 
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(ASF) was not prepared to address armed conflicts on the continent. Human Rights Watch 
issued a report in September 2014 which accuses the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM)24 of sexual abuse and exploitation of women and teenage girls. Though issuing 
guidelines or giving training on child protection may not prevent such human rights violations 
from happening, it could set a standard procedure for protecting CIAC. Francis Onditi25 
argues that the problem lies in the AU‟s lack of a doctrine for protection of civilians in armed 
conflict and this prevents its peacekeepers from taking the action necessary on the ground to 
protect children. He says that: 
 
When the military [AU peacekeepers] gets to a militia it is not supposed to fire 
immediately. What it‟s supposed to do is to get out of the camp and then hide 
somewhere behind to make sure civilians, including children are not casualties or they 
are not collateral damage. That is contradicting with the asymmetrical conflict situations 
that Africa is experiencing because if you are to follow those guidelines that are 
provided by the UN and the African Union then you will not protect even the civilians 
themselves. What we call asymmetrical warfare and conflict that has emerged since 
1990 in Africa has really challenged the traditional doctrine of peacekeeping and 
therefore there is a need for that overhaul.  
 
Developing a doctrine for protection of civilians in armed conflicts would ultimately require 
political will of AU member states to accept a change to how peace support operations are 
carried out. More importantly protection of civilians and especially CIAC has to be high on the 
AU agenda for the required change to be made to the modus operandi of APSA.  
 
Another capacity constraint for AU bodies with a mandate to protect CIAC is a lack of 
monitoring mechanisms. Data and figures on how many civilians in general let alone children 
are affected by armed conflicts in Africa – and in other parts of the world for that matter - are 
difficult to access and the situation on the ground is usually not suitable for monitoring. Dr 
Dersso (2013) says that: “another limitation of the PSC‟s peace operations relate to the lack 
of a mandate to monitor and report serious violations of human rights” (p.208). No mandate 
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means no political backing from member states. He further explains that there is also a lack of 
expertise in AU peace support operations to monitor and report on human rights violations 
(Ibid). Without monitoring mechanisms those who violate children‟s rights during armed 
conflicts will continue doing so with impunity. Dr Solomon Dersso26 says that: “the idea of 
monitoring can be used for the purpose of first giving a signal to the actors [in an armed 
conflict] that whatever it is that they are doing is being monitored, is being followed up”. 
Tiruneh Sinnshaw27 suggests that a monitoring mechanism can be used by the AU to name 
and shame governments that commit violations against CIAC. As mentioned in Chapter 2 this 
approach is being applied by the UN Security Council and some say it has proven successful 
(Sablierѐ 2012). An opportunity for the AU could be to collaborate with the UN Security 
Council‟s Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) to access data on CIAC. The AU‟s 
lack of such a monitoring mechanism can be seen as a consequence of CIAC not being high 
on its agenda and one can argue that had it been it would have been established by now. The 
AU Department of Social Affairs (2010b) suggests that the challenge of what it calls “missing 
data” can be addressed through cooperation among AU bodies which once again raises the 
challenge of synergy which has so far left a lot to be desired. Without a monitoring 
mechanism the AU cannot establish the needs of CIAC thereby rendering them invisible and 
this makes it difficult or almost impossible for the ACERWC to make empirical 
recommendations to member states on this issue.  
 
3.4. Poor coordination with other actors 
 
Poor coordination between the AU and other actors involved in providing protection for CIAC 
is another manifestation of the issue not being high on the AU agenda. These actors include 
RECs and civil society organizations (CSOs). As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 8 RECs 
recognized by the AU are playing an increasingly important role in protection of CIAC as 
pillars of APSA. RECs have more political clout at the sub-regional level as they are located 
at a closer proximity to areas of armed conflict.  Dr Shimelis Tsegaye28 points out that:  
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Given their compact nature, the common history of member countries, their similar 
political, economic and legal environment, coupled with their geographic proximity, 
RECs have been effective in intervening quickly and effectively to bring about peace 
both through peaceful negotiations and armed interventions. 
 
According to the structure of ASF (African Standby Force) – which has yet to be 
operationalized – RECs in theory are supposed to contribute to AU peace support operations 
whenever the need arises.  Francis Onditi29 suggests that given the geopolitical and cultural 
dynamics of different regions in Africa it would be difficult for AU to coordinate action in favor 
of protecting CIAC. He suggests that RECs are in a better position to deal with the issue at 
the sub-regional level before it is taken up to the AU. However scholars such as Makinda and 
Okumu (2008) suggest that scare resources are being diverted to RECs which could 
otherwise be used to build a stronger and more effective AU. Coordinating conflict early 
warning systems and peace support operations with RECs has been a challenge for the AU. 
In an article entitled The Peacekeeping Travails of the AU and the Regional Economic 
Communities Adekeye Adebajo30 points out that: “ECOWAS and SADC [two RECs] that 
established security mechanisms before the AU was born in 2002 – and in the case of 
ECOWAS, have solid peacekeeping experience – often feel that the AU has more to learn 
from them rather than vice-versa” (cited in Akokpari et al 2009, p.134). This indicates that 
there is a reluctance to take orders from the AU.  
 
The fact that APSA has not been fully operationalized can partly be attributed to poor 
coordination between the AU and RECs. Why is this important for protection of CIAC in 
Africa? Unless there is better coordination between these major actors their ability to protect 
CIAC - and to address other peace and security issues for that matter - will remain wanting 
and it also does not bode well for their credibility. A report commissioned by the PSC entitled 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): 2010 Assessment Study argues that: “there 
appears to be a disconnect between the AU PSC and similar organs in the RECs. This is a 
crucial gap given that enforcing decisions of the PSC rests with its members who are also 
members of the RECs/RMs” (African Union 2010c, p.64). This essentially means that poor 
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coordination with RECs has a negative impact on the PSC‟s credibility as the AU‟s lead organ 
for addressing peace and security issues in Africa. Catherine Maina31 on her part says that: 
“[RECs such as] ECOWAS, SADC and EAC are really working on issues of children”. She 
also points out that one opportunity with regards to protecting CIAC is that the ACERWC is in 
discussions with different RECs on ways to improve their collaboration, including the latter 
providing them with support to visit areas where children are being affected. As this is a new 
initiative it is too early to tell how this relationship is developing and whether it can be seen as 
a model of AU-RECs coordination. Ultimately however RECs are comprised of AU member 
states hence if there is a lack of political will to address protection of CIAC at the AU level it is 
difficult to imagine that it would be any different at the sub-regional level. Poor coordination on 
this issue also exists between the AU and civil society organizations (CSOs).      
 
Civil society organizations played a seminal role in drafting the ACRWC and advocating for its 
adoption by the OAU and they engage in all areas of children‟s wellbeing, including their 
protection in armed conflicts. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the CRC Committee and ACERWC 
need CSOs to submit alternative reports to those submitted by States Parties in order to 
comprehensively assess the implementation of children‟s rights in any given country. This 
means that through these reports they can bring to light violations against CIAC. Despite their 
efforts to engage with the AU they have often found the organization to be a restrictive 
environment. Franco Wandabwa32 says that CSOs find it very difficult to access bodies of the 
AU‟s peace and security framework. Chikezie Anyanwu33 agrees and says that: “[t]he 
tendency for us in Africa is anything that comes from civil society is critical or is criticism so it 
should not be listened to. To some bureaucrats the moment you mention civil society [they 
say] "oh those trouble makers" (sic). CSOs with the technical capacity to deal with issues 
related to protection of CIAC usually find it difficult to engage with military establishments. 
Franco Wandabwa says that: “there should be an arrangement in terms of tapping this 
technical capacity from civil society so that we can move forward in terms of creating 
structures and institutions for protection of children”.  Poor coordination between peace and 
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security bodies of the AU and CSOs means that the former will not benefit from local 
knowledge in areas of armed conflict.  
 
One opportunity for CSO engagement with AU is the earlier mentioned open sessions on 
women and CIAC organized by the PSC. However these meetings spend very little time 
talking about CIAC and instead give greater attention to gender related issues. Matthias 
Wevelsiep34 suggests that CSOs should work on creating alliances among themselves and 
address disagreements in their own agendas in order to effectively engage with the AU. One 
such effort is the Civil Society Organizations Forum on the ACRWC - a platform where child-
focused CSOs from all regions of Africa discuss children‟s rights issues on the continent and 
issue recommendations to the ACERWC. Members of the latter also participate in this forum 
which is usually timed to coincide with their own sessions. CSOs can also be granted an 
observer‟s status at ACERWC sessions which gives them a platform to advocate for 
children‟s issues that they feel should be addressed by this Committee.  
 
The protection of CIAC in Africa - as well as elsewhere - goes beyond setting up institutional 
and legal frameworks, as important as they are. Despite the gravity of the situation the issue 
is not high on the AU agenda and this manifests itself in weak institutional and structural 
capacities. Challenges exist in the areas of: setting priorities, structure, resources and 
capacity, and poor coordination with other actors. The AU lacks an agenda and structure 
needed to holistically address the issue. There is also little synergy among AU bodies with 
mandates that include the protection of CIAC. In addition to this, they lack the resources and 
capacity required to ensure that children in these situations are protected. There is also poor 
coordination with RECs and CSOs in this area. Opportunities exist for addressing these 
challenges however there is a lack of political will among many AU member states to support 
changes that need to be made. As the actions of member states play a major role in how the 
AU functions, the following chapter will discuss why they lack the political will to deal with the 
issue of protection of CIAC. 
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Chapter 4 Do AU member states have the political will to protect children in armed 
conflicts? 
 
The African Union (AU) is not a supranational government with the power to enforce its will on 
its member states rather it is the commitment and political backing of the latter that 
determines its success. It is designed to support governments in implementing their 
obligations under different international and regional (AU) treaties. Lack of political will among 
AU member states to protect children in armed conflicts (CIAC) is preventing this issue from 
being high on the AU agenda.  
 
4.1. Setting Priorities  
 
Many AU member states‟ lack of political will on protection of CIAC is partly due to the fact 
that the issue is not high on their national political agendas. One of the findings of this study is 
that there seems to be a problem with setting priorities at the national level as children‟s rights 
in general is seen as being of secondary importance - as is the case within the AU. With 
regards to how governments of AU member states approach the issue of protection of CIAC, 
Chikezie Anyanwu1 says that “[i]t would be left for when we are finished [with everything else] 
we can talk about the children and women” (sic). Franco Wandabwa2 on his part says that: 
“[i]t is not that most African countries do not want to address [protection of CIAC] but it is just 
a challenge that sometimes they tell you that it is about priorities and all the different rhetoric 
that we hear about”. What are these priorities? Children‟s issues may be of secondary 
importance to governments especially when they are one of the parties in an armed conflict 
which is most often the case in Africa. Matthias Wevelsiep3 agrees and says that: “you might 
find that some parts of government or government as a whole is actually involved in the 
conflict” and “broadly you can see that actually they are concerned for their own society their 
concern might be more towards their own ethnic group or even towards their own power 
base”. This suggests that children who are not from the ethnic group that is dominant in a 
government are at a greater disadvantage and more vulnerable to being victims of armed 
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conflict. Almost all interviewees who participated in this study said that governments of AU 
member states are not doing enough to protect CIAC.  
 
Another challenge to setting CIAC as a priority at national level is a communication and 
information void as many people in AU member states do not know about children‟s rights 
that their governments are obliged to uphold. Many AU member states have low literacy rates 
which compounds this void. A web page on the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization‟s (UNESCO) website entitled Literacy and non-formal education states 
that: “38 % of African adults (some 153 millions) are illiterate, two-thirds of these are women” 
and “[o]nly 1 % of national education budget[s] of most African governments is earmarked to 
address the issue of literacy” (UNESCO s.a.). Low budget allocation by governments to 
address illiteracy perpetuates this information and communication void illustrating that this is 
not a priority on national agendas. Adult literacy rates can however vary between countries for 
example a factsheet by UNESCO‟s Institute of Statistics entitled Adult and Youth Literacy 
points out that figures can range from a low of 25 percent in Guinea to a high of 94 percent in 
Equatorial Guinea according to 2011 figures (UNESCO 2013). One would also have to take 
into account differences in population size as well. Nevertheless, illiteracy continues to be a 
problem in many AU member states.  
 
This information void also prevents people from communicating violations against children‟s 
rights - including those committed during armed conflicts - to the ACERWC. Lloyd argues 
that:  
 
In practice, granted rights [by the ACRWC] are often violated with impunity because 
unaware of such rights, people are unable to take steps to demand them. Thus, 
communications [on violations of children‟s rights] do not reach the Committee 
[ACERWC] and in return the effectiveness of the Committee is reduced” (2002a, p.27).  
 
Dr Kaime agrees and points out that: “[t]he availability of information on the rights and welfare 
of the child has a direct impact on the quality of protection that children receive” (2009, 
p.178). Governments‟ inaction to address this information void affects the effectiveness of 
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ACERWC. Franco Wandabwa4 says that he has personal experiences of travelling to some 
African countries where he would visit a Ministry of Children‟s Affairs or Women‟s Affairs and 
staff would tell him that they do not know about ACRWC. He suggests that: “maybe they are 
not informed, they do not know about it, they do not report about it, it is not used, it is not 
domesticated” (sic). Raising awareness about ACRWC and CRC at the societal level is part 
of governments‟ responsibility to domesticate these treaties that they are party to. How can 
governments plug this information and communication void? Answering this question goes 
beyond the scope of this study and an area for future research would be to identify what are 
the missing links between government commitments at the international and global level and 
national structures for communicated them to the societal public. 
 
A third challenge to setting CIAC as a priority at the national level is that there is a wide gap 
between governments‟ ratification of child rights treaties and their implementation. Chikezie 
Anyanwu5 argues that: “[i]t is not an issue of legislation or ratification, it is an issue of 
implementation and I think there is a BIG, BIG gap between implementation and ratification”. 
In 2010, the AU Department of Social Affairs reported that most AU member states had failed 
to meet their commitments to a 2007 resolution on a plan of action for an Africa Fit for 
Children (AFFC) - a guideline for improving children‟s wellbeing that includes ensuring their 
right to protection (African Union 2010b). Franco Wandabwa suggests that even though 
governments ratify treaties at the AU level some of them do not feel obliged to domestic them. 
This raises a question on whether some AU member states sign treaties with no real intention 
of implementing them.  
 
Despite these challenges, Franco Wandabwa says that some governments have prioritized 
protection of CIAC. For example, he says that: “[t]he Government of Uganda did a lot of work 
around demobilization of children, those who are returning from the LRA [Lord‟s Resistance 
Army] conflict. A lot of work was invested by the government around demobilization and 
making sure that children are able to reintegrate in their communities”. He however notes that 
more could have been done by the government to prevent children from being recruited or 
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abducted by LRA in the first place. As mentioned in the previous chapter the Ugandan 
government blocked efforts by ACERWC to investigate a communication it received regarding 
its failure to protect children from being abducted by the LRA. Having being forced out of 
Uganda, the LRA now operates in areas bordering the Central African Republic, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and South Sudan and the AU has established a regional task force to 
fight against the group from multiple fronts. The AU Commission says that: “[e]ach of the 
forces under the AU‟s Regional Task Force against the LRA operating in the Central African 
Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan have a child protection 
component who is responsible for providing [CIAC with] a secure environment” (African Union 
2014a, p.9). It also says that each of the military forces that are part of the task force have 
standard operating procedures on how to receive children associated with armed forces or 
armed groups. After documentation children are transferred into the care of local child 
protection partners in their country of origin (Ibid).  
 
The Government of South Sudan, according to Franco6, is also prioritizing protection of CIAC 
through its post-conflict reintegration programs. According to the AU Commission: 
 
In the Republic of South Sudan, for example, a Sudan People‟s Liberation Army CPU 
[Child Protection Unit] was established in December 2009. 1,600 SPLA officers were 
selected and trained as members of the CPU, a military Code of Conduct was 
developed, and more than 10,000 officers and non-commissioned officers benefited 
from child protection awareness training.  At the same time military orders were 
released to division commanders to release and hand over child recruits (African Union 
2014a, p.6).  
 
It also points out that Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi have undertaken similar processes of 
training military personnel in child protection and ensuring the release of child recruits. There 
is a big difference between receiving training and practice and information on the latter is 
difficult to find. Whatever progress was being made in South Sudan was however short lived 
as fighting between factions of the Sudan Peoples‟ Liberation Army (SPLA) broke out on 15 
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December 2013 and children were recruited to fight. In a report to the UNSC on 15 May 2014, 
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon said that there was evidence that both factions were 
committing grave violations against children including recruiting them as child soldiers 
(Secretary General Report 2014). At the time of writing, his Special Representative on 
Children and Armed Conflict is trying to get the government to recommit to the process of 
ensuring that no children are recruited in its armed forces. This example shows that children‟s 
rights can easily be sidelined whenever armed conflict erupts. Another challenge to protection 
of CIAC that negatively affects implementation of child rights treaties at the national level of 
AU member states is lack of resources and capacity.  
 
4.2. Resources and Capacity 
 
Many AU member states‟ governments do not have the resources and capacity to protect 
CIAC. One challenge in this regard is poverty and socioeconomic factors. Tiruneh Sinnshaw7 
observes that: “the evidence seems to indicate that child protection, human rights seem to be 
functions of overall socioeconomic development. There is better appreciation of child rights in 
most socioeconomically developed countries, China not exempted”. Dr Solomon Dersso8 
agrees and says that protection of CIAC is related to countries‟ political and socioeconomic 
failures and one cannot address the former without dealing with the latter. However this 
should not be misinterpreted to mean that governments should wait until they have dealt with 
their political and socioeconomic failures before addressing protection of CIAC rather these 
should be dealt with simultaneously. For example, as Somalia is trying to rebuild after being a 
failed state for more than 2 decades its government is trying to implement a plan to protect 
children from recruitment into its armed forces and from being killed or maimed in the ongoing 
fight against the armed group Al-Shabaab.  
 
Poverty can also be a pull factor for children to join armed groups as mentioned in Chapter 1. 
The AU Commission agrees and says that: “[i]n countries experiencing conflict, prevailing 
social conditions―including chronic poverty, high unemployment, and children without 
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parents―may increase the risk of children being (re)recruited into armed forces or groups” 
(African Union 2014a, p.18). However, in an article entitled Children and DDR Irma Specht9 
argues that: “although poverty may create a general vulnerability to military recruitment, it 
cannot be the only factor” and “[p]overty is an environmental factor that sets the context, 
without which the risk of recruitment would be greatly reduced” (cited in Nosworthy 2009, 
p.195). Closely linked to poverty and socioeconomic factors is a challenge of lack of adequate 
resources for child protection.  
 
Lack of resources for child protection is a function of political will of AU member states‟ 
governments to address the issue. A 2012 report by the Africawide Movement for Children 
(AMC)10 entitled An Africa Fit for Children: Progress and Challenges says that: “[g]enerally, 
resource mobilisation and allocation towards the realisation and enhancement of children‟s 
rights is weak in most African countries” and “there is evidence of poor governance leading to 
the misuse of available funds as well as lack of the necessary political will to invest in child 
wellbeing” (2012, pp.17-18). Misuse of funds could mean that they are lost to corruption or 
are diverted for other purposes. Dr. Solomon Dersso11 on his part suggests that in times of 
armed conflicts governments lack the capacity and resources to protect CIAC as they are 
more invested in maintaining political power.  
 
With regard to domestication of CRC or ACRWC, the AU Department of Social Affairs 
(2010b) says that legal reforms at the national level are usually only implemented in urban 
areas due to resource constraints. Is this due to lack of resources or do governments only 
implement these reforms in urban areas to present a façade of progress to donors and not out 
of a genuine commitment to ensure protection of children‟s rights? Though answering this 
question goes beyond the scope of this study suffice to say that a lack of resources for child 
protection in general is partly a consequence of a lack of political will by governments to 
prioritize children‟s rights. Another challenge related to resource and capacity constraints for 
child protection is weak institutional capacities at the national level.  
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In many AU member states, government bodies charged with addressing child-related issues 
are plagued by weak institutional capacities. The AMC agrees and observes that: “[in most 
African countries] limited progress has been made towards the establishment of strong and 
effective institutions to propel and advance the realisation of children‟s rights at country level”. 
ACPF takes a stronger position in saying that: “[in most African countries] child protection 
systems are largely non-existent” (2013, p.xiii). How can this be the case 25 years after most 
African countries adopted CRC and 15 years since ACRWC came into force? Franco 
Wandabwa12 suggests an explanation by saying that most African countries are developing 
countries and the institutional and structural framework for child protection is in a “growing 
mode” therefore one cannot compare them with more established systems in the West. This 
argument however cannot explain why some governments fail to ensure that children are not 
recruited into armed forces or at least why they do not adopt a strict policy for militaries to 
abide by. Tiruneh Sinnshaw13 offers a different perspective in saying that governments of 
African and some Southern Asian countries - especially Bangladesh and Myanmar (Burma) - 
have too many priorities on their political agenda including poverty alleviation, education, and 
infrastructure development and these are usually set by external actors. He says that: 
“[African governments] are always responding to the World Bank, UN Resolutions, Summit 
Goals, to the Millennium Development targets [United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals]” and “they are busy reacting to international decisions rather than really making their 
own decisions based on their own resources and capabilities”. This study has not found any 
evidence to suggest that donors can influence AU member states to invest more in child 
protection hence this could be an area for future research. Were children‟s protection high on 
national political agendas governments would include it among their set of priorities before 
seeking external assistance rather than making it an afterthought. A briefing note by the Bond 
Child Rights Group14 (s.a.) entitled Children’s rights and the post-2015 development agenda 
observes argues that the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) - an 
international framework for poverty alleviation in developing countries - did not include a goal 
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on child protection. This indicates that there is also work to be done to ensure that child 
protection is high on the international agenda as well.  
 
At the national level of AU member states there is also a challenge of synergy between 
government bodies with a mandate relating to protection of children‟s rights. The AU 
Department of Social Affairs points out that: “[m]any countries have government agencies 
with a mandate for the rights and wellbeing of the child that seem to be insufficiently aware of 
or engaged with other government agencies who have child-related responsibilities in the 
context of conflict or post-conflict activities” (African Union 2010b, p.102). Children‟s affairs at 
the national level are most often than not clumped with social affairs/services, gender or 
women‟s affairs and dealt with by one Ministry that is usually among those that receive the 
lowest budget allocation (ACPF 2013). However, Francis Onditi15 says that African countries 
with adequate resources are adopting a new mind set and establishing independent Ministries 
for children‟s affairs. However the AMC argues that: “[in most African countries] the 
institutional framework for children‟s rights often lacks impetus and sustainability” and “[t]his is 
due, principally, to lack of autonomy (financial in particular), overlaps in mandates and 
duplication of efforts” (2012, p.14). It also describes challenges to the institutional framework 
for children‟s rights in Uganda and Cameroon. AMC (2012) says that in Uganda, a National 
Council for Children - established in 1996 to coordinate child-related activities - was unable to 
fulfill its mandate due to a lack of autonomy, limited resources and a heavy dependence on 
support from CSOs. In the case of Cameroon, it says that there are 6 Departments within 6 
different Ministries with a mandate to ensure children‟s rights making it difficult to follow-up on 
how the country is implementing its obligations (Ibid). It also says that a body established to 
coordinate child focused activities in the country called the National Commission for the 
Protection of Children at Risk, Juvenile Delinquents and Abandoned Children lacks adequate 
resources, has no permanent office, and lacks a presence at regional and local levels (Ibid). 
These examples illustrate a lack of synergy and one may argue that spreading responsibilities 
among many government agencies is not an optimal use of financial resources and this 
creates an environment where duplication of efforts is likely to occur. Another challenge at the 
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level of AU member states that contributes to their governments‟ lack of political will to 
support protection of CIAC is traditions and societal perceptions on children‟s issues.  
 
4.3. Traditions and Societal Perceptions  
 
Traditions and societal perceptions in many AU member states contribute to their 
government‟s lack of political will to address children‟s rights issues, including protection of 
CIAC. One challenge is in striking a balance between governments‟ obligations to implement 
their obligations under CRC and ACRWC on the one hand and a need to respect traditional 
and religious practices and laws on the other. The AU Department of Social Affairs observes 
that: “despite the clarity of provisions of the African Children‟s Charter [ACRWC], domestic 
lawmakers often remain resistant to the passage of laws that place the best interests of the 
child above traditional and religious practices and laws” (African Union 2010b, p.96). As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the reasons why AU member states decided to adopt the 
ACRWC is because the CRC did not take into account children‟s rights issues that were 
unique to the continent such as harmful traditional practices and the duties of a child. Despite 
the fact that ACRWC was designed to illustrate complementary between human rights and 
culture it faces resistance in its implementation. Franco Wandabwa16 says that realizing child 
protection at national levels is challenged by perceptions that child rights treaties ratified 
abroad are foreign concepts that do not apply to the local context. The wording of some of the 
Articles of the ACRWC leaves room for interpretation at the national level.  Article 31 of the 
ACRWC on „Responsibility of the Child‟ states that:  
 
The child, subject to his age and ability, and such limitations as may be contained in the 
present Charter, shall have the duty…to serve his national community by placing his 
physical and intellectual abilities at its service [and]… to preserve and strengthen the 
independence and the integrity of his country‟. 
 
Despite the drafters‟ intentions to ensure cultural legitimacy of the Charter, this Article could 
be misinterpreted by the leadership of armed forces for example as allowing for children‟s 
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recruitment under the pretext that he/she is protecting “the integrity of his country”. The 
ACERWC has not issued an elaboration on the meaning of Article 31 and most other articles 
of the ACRWC for that matter (African Union 2010b). This is mostly due to its own resource 
and capacity constraints as discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
Another challenge related to traditions and perceptions is that children‟s rights - including their 
right to protection - are not developed at the societal level in many AU member states. 
Tiruneh Sinnshaw17 says that: “there is this general inertia and ignorance about not looking at 
children differently and a lack of appreciation of [their] special needs”. Lloyd agrees and 
argues that: “[c]hildren‟s rights are problematic, because not all African societies believe that 
children deserve special status” (2002a, p.31). Tiruneh Sinnshaw and Chikezie Anyanwu18 
both point out that though there is a love for children in most African cultures children‟s issues 
are not seen to be a priority. Francis Onditi19 argues that:  
 
If you look at the development framework in Africa, children have never been in the 
center [of the agenda] because in the African context children are not traditionally 
expected to make decisions. They are supposed to follow the decisions that are been 
made by other people, either parents, guardians or the society or the traditional 
leaders.  
 
This suggests that children in many African countries lack opportunities to voice their opinions 
on issues that are important to them which may be posing a barrier to their ability to influence 
national political agendas. This in turn weakens governments‟ capacity to protect children. 
Tiruneh Sinnshaw says that there is an assumption at the societal level of most African 
countries that children are innocent and therefore will not be victimized in armed conflicts. As 
long as protection of CIAC is not prioritized at the societal level it will not be high on national 
political agendas. In support of this, Francis Onditi20 says that: “[African governments] have 
not made an effort at the societal level to develop institutions that would consequently change 
people's attitudes towards children. In certain societies children are not considered as people 
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who can contribute to either a social, economic or political process”. This illustrates how the 
challenge of weak institutional capacities affects how children‟s issues are viewed at the 
societal level and this is a manifestation and product of a lack of political will from 
governments to prioritize children‟s rights on their national political agendas. 
 
This chapter has discussed some challenges at the level of AU member states that seem to 
contribute to their lack of political will to support protection of CIAC from being high on the AU 
agenda. One challenge is a problem of setting priorities at the national level as children‟s 
rights in general is seen as being of secondary importance. In addition to this, a 
communication and information void exists where many people in AU member states do not 
know about children‟s rights that their governments are obliged to uphold hence they cannot 
hold them to account. Another challenge is that many AU member states do not have the 
resources and capacity to protect CIAC. This is influenced by poverty and socioeconomic 
factors and weak institutional capacities. A third challenge is that traditions and societal 
perceptions in many AU member states contribute to their government‟s lack of political will to 
address children‟s rights issues. These are not an exhaustive list of all the challenges at the 
national level that could contribute to governments‟ lack of political will. All of these challenges 
are however reflected in the way AU member states engage with issues of children‟s rights - 
including protection of CIAC - at the AU. Given the fact that decision making in the AU is 
concentrated at the apex level of the AU Assembly, protection of CIAC will not be high on the 
agenda until member states make children‟s rights a priority on their national agendas.    
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
 
This study set out to investigate whether the African Union (AU) has the capacity to protect 
children in armed conflicts. Given the gravity of the situation in Africa and the fact that children 
make up about half of the continent‟s population it seems that addressing this issue is a test 
of the AU‟s commitment to ensuring peace and security and protecting human rights. The 
main findings of this study are that AU lacks the institutional and structural capacity to protect 
children in armed conflicts and a determining factor is a lack of political will among many of its 
member states to deal with the issue. Its institutional and structural challenges to addressing 
protection of children in armed conflicts lie in the areas of: setting priorities, structure, 
resources and capacity, and coordination with other actors. Challenges at the national level of 
AU member states – the principal actors in the organization - lie in the areas of setting 
priorities, resources and capacity, and traditions and societal perceptions. All of these 
challenges are reflected in the way AU member states engage with issues of children‟s rights 
- including protection of children in armed conflicts - at the AU.  
 
The theory developed from an analysis of this study‟s findings is that the AU‟s lack of capacity 
to protect children in armed conflicts is both a manifestation and product of the issue not 
being high on its agenda. It shows how the identified issues of political will and institutional 
and structural challenges are interlinked in that the latter cannot be addressed without 
changes to the former. Given the fact that decision making in the AU is concentrated at the 
apex level of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, it does not seem likely 
that protection of children in armed conflicts will be high on the organization‟s agenda until 
member states make children‟s rights a priority on their own national agendas.    
 
The author acknowledges that there are many important issues related to protection of 
children in armed conflicts in Africa including the role of the family, community, houses of 
religious worship, traditional leaders, and the private sector among others. Although these 
issues were not included in the research design, questions for in-depth interviews with key 
informants were designed in a way that would allow for them to emerge. Indeed some of them 
were raised by interviewees however not in direct relation to the subject of the study. 
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Due to the dearth of literature on this subject there are a number of issues identified in this 
study that require further research. There is for example a need to investigate why many 
governments in Africa have been unable to plug the information and communication void at 
the societal level where many people have no knowledge about the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) as well as other instruments for protecting children‟s rights. What are the missing links 
between government commitments at the international and global level and national 
structures for communicated them to the societal public? There is also a need for greater 
knowledge on how legal reforms for protection of children‟s rights are made at national levels. 
Why are legal reforms only implemented in urban areas? Is it due to resource and capacity 
constraints? This question relates to another area for future research which is to investigate 
what influence donors have on AU member states‟ decisions on how much they invest on 
child protection. This is by no means an exhaustive list of areas for future research rather they 
are questions that emerged during this study.  
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